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Introduction
Firms spend considerable time and resources on choosing their workers. For instance, data
from the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP) on 1,783 German private-sector establishments
with 50 employees or more shows that at the average employer, a successful applicant for
a non-managerial position experiences three hours of pre-hire screening (LPP, waves 1-4,
2012-2018).
Some theoretical work in labor economics takes screening into account when modelling
the hiring process and shows that doing so makes a difference (e.g., Villena-Rolda´n, 2012;
Wolthoff, 2017). There is also some empirical evidence describing determinants of the
screening or recruitment process that are related to job or firm characteristics as well
as some work exploring the correlation of screening/recruitment with match quality (see
Oyer and Schaefer, 2010, for an overview). However, serious attempts to identify causal
relationships are rare (e.g., Pellizzari, 2011).
On the effect of labor market regulation on firms’ worker selection, hardly any evidence
exists. That is, we know very little about whether firms’ hiring becomes more or less
selective when labor market institutions change. In part, the dearth of empirical evidence
on the link between labor market policy and screening may be a data issue: studying the
selectiveness of firms’ hiring requires information about the ability of new hires, which
is rarely observed. The three articles constituting this thesis try to reduce this gap in
the literature in two ways. First, Chapters 1 and 2 provide some of the first evidence
on the causal effect of minimum wages and employment protection, respectively, on the
selectiveness of firms’ hiring. Second, Chapter 3 offers an empirical assessment of a widely
known estimated ability proxy. Named after their originators in Abowd et al. (1999), AKM
worker effects are time-invariant individual wage premia estimated from labor market data
and are used as a measure of worker productivity by a growing list of empirical studies.
Why is it important to know if firms respond to policy changes by hiring more or less
selectively? The primary benefit of evidence on this causal link is that it may inform
the design of labor market policy. For example, a tightening of regulation may have the
unintended side effect of making firms hire more selectively. Then, in addition to benefiting
a targeted group of workers, the policy change may have negative distributional effects on
a group of workers that is particularly vulnerable. That is, the least productive workers
may find it even harder to get hired following the reform-induced increase in firms’ hiring
standards and may get trapped in unemployment.
Finding out how well estimated ability proxies work, on the other hand, is primarily
intended to help researchers. In particular, this includes empirical economists who need a
1
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measure of individual productivity and would like to know the pros and cons of using esti-
mated AKM worker effects. Quantifying their performance as an ability measure appears
especially useful in light of a number of recent contributions questioning AKM worker ef-
fects’ validity as a productivity proxy both on theoretical and on empirical grounds (e.g.,
Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011; Abowd et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2018).
Chapter 1 investigates whether the 2015 introduction of a statutory minimum wage
in Germany made a sample of 1,491 private-sector employers hire more selectively. My
difference-in-differences analysis compares the evolution of realized hiring standards across
establishments treated and untreated by the reform. I proxy hiring standards by estab-
lishments’ minimum hire quality. As a measure of hire quality I use worker effects from
two-way fixed-effect log wage regressions estimated before my period of analysis, which
capture both observed and unobserved ability. To classify employers as treated I rely on
their pre-reform wage structure: whether or not they employed sub-minimum wage work-
ers. I find that in response to the minimum wage introduction, treated establishments
hired more productive workers: the relative increase in new hires’ minimum hire quality is
18.9% of a standard deviation. Using pre-reform survey information on screening intensity
I show that the effect is increasing in the importance of screening to the establishment’s
hiring process. This strengthens my interpretation of the effect on minimum hire quality
as a change in employers’ hiring standards.
Chapter 2 estimates the causal effect of employment protection on firms’ worker selec-
tion. Together with Jan Sauermann I study a 2001 policy change in Sweden that reduced
dismissal costs for firms with less than ten employees. These small firms employ over a
tenth of Sweden’s workforce. Our difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ hiring uses in-
dividual ability measures including estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores
from the military draft. Comparing treated small firms to slightly larger, untreated ones we
find that the reform reduced minimum hire quality by five per cent of a standard deviation,
half of which we can attribute to firms’ hiring becoming less selective. Consistent with this,
we show that employers’ reliance on network-based hiring also goes down as firms react to
the reduction of dismissal costs. Our results help discriminate between existing theories,
supporting the prediction that firms shift their hiring standards in response to changes in
dismissal costs.
Chapter 3 is a descriptive study that assesses the performance of estimated worker ef-
fects as an ability proxy. It is also joint work with Jan Sauermann. We focus on worker
effects from two-way fixed-effect log-wage regressions as introduced by Abowd et al. (1999).
Using Swedish register data, we study the correlation between such worker effect estimates
and standardized cognitive test scores from the military draft. For the period from 2007
2
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to 2013 we find a correlation of roughly .4. We show that this is more than three quar-
ters of the predictive performance achieved by machine-learning algorithms. However, we
find that the worker effects’ prediction performance varies with observed worker and firm
characteristics—for example, across industries. Moreover, we identify biases—for instance,
the worker effects underestimate cognitive test scores for blue-collar workers. Our analy-
sis of the worker effects’ determinants shows that they “contain” a significant amount of
both skill-related and non-skill attributes such as education and cognitive ability as well
as age. Finally, our exploration of the importance of estimation ingredients for prediction
performance broadly supports the estimation choices of existing applications.
While Chapters 1 and 2 both study labor market regulation as a determinant of firms’
worker selection, they focus on very different policy changes: a tightening versus a loosening
of regulation and the creation of a uniform wage floor versus a modification of dismissal
costs. To the extent, however, that the two reforms can be compared, my estimates
of their effects are consistent with each other. In a broad sense both minimum wages
and employment protection provisions change the cost of labor; Chapter 1 suggests an
exogenous increase in the cost of labor makes firms’ hiring more selective and Chapter 2
indicates that an exogenous decrease in the cost of labor makes firms’ hiring less selective.
The studies appear in less agreement about the size of the respective reforms’ effects: the
increase in minimum hire quality in Chapter 1 is nearly eight times as large as the decrease
in minimum hire quality in Chapter 2. One potential explanation for this difference is
that the immediate costs imposed by minimum wages are more salient than the potential
future costs of employment protection. Another potential explanation is that the 2001
Swedish employment protection reform represented a small reduction in dismissal costs:
the principle was maintained that dismissals are allowed only on the grounds of proven
economic necessity (not out of mere dissatisfaction with a worker’s ability).
In Chapter 1 I choose a binary measure for establishments’ minimum wage affectedness,
arguing that employers’ incentives to raise their hiring thresholds does not depend on the
share of pre-reform sub-minimum wage workers, only on whether or not they employ very
low-paid workers at all. In Chapter 2 we also work with a binary measure for firms’
exposure to the employment protection reform, but we show that the effect is stronger for
smaller firms and argue that this is due to the reform’s greater bite—the share of workers
for whom employment protection is lifted by the reform is much larger for small firms.
This may appear inconsistent. The reason it is not a contradiction is that the Swedish
reform actually reduced dismissal costs more for smaller firms than for bigger ones while
the German reform did not introduce a higher minimum wage for employers with more
low-wage workers. Establishments with a larger share of sub-minimum wage workers would
only have to apply their new hiring threshold to a larger number of new hires, not raise
their hiring threshold further.
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By and large Chapter 3 provides an empirical validation of the preceding chapters’
use of AKM worker effects as an individual ability proxy. The most relevant caveat that
emerges is that the worker effects contain a substantial age component. In Chapter 1, where
I find that a minimum wage introduction increases the selectiveness of hiring, the age bias
of AKM worker effects might exaggerate the reform’s true effect on worker selection. This
would be the case if employers affected by the minimum wage started hiring older workers
in response to the policy change. I show that this is not the case. In Chapter 2, where we
identify a downward shift in firms’ hiring standards caused by a reduction of employment
protection, the age bias in AKM worker effects might also overstate the policy change’s
effect on worker selection. This would happen if treated firms responded to the reform by
hiring younger workers. While this is theoretically plausible, we find the opposite.
There is a small body of evidence on the link between minimum wages and firms’ hiring
standards, most of it descriptive (Fairris and Bujanda, 2008; Hirsch et al., 2015; Gu¨rtzgen
et al., 2016). My findings in Chapter 1 confirm and extend these results by providing causal
evidence that employers indeed hire more selectively in response to minimum wages. In
a contemporaneous working paper, Clemens et al. (2018) also find that minimum wages
raise hiring standards by looking at job postings. Chapter 1 differs from their paper in its
focus on realized hires using worker inflow data and its focus on unobserved worker ability.
Three existing papers present evidence consistent with an effect of employment protec-
tion on firms’ worker selection (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004; Marinescu, 2009; Bjuggren
and Skedinger, 2018). Our findings in Chapter 2 are consistent with the results of these
papers. They go further than them by providing evidence on new hires’ ability and by
discriminating between potential channels driving the effect.
To my knowledge, there is no paper that uses an established measure of individual
ability to assess the validity of AKM worker effects as an ability proxy. That doing so
is nonetheless interesting is underscored by several methodological contributions, some of
them recent, that call into question whether AKM worker effects are correlated with the
individual’s true productivity (e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011; Hagedorn et al., 2017;
Abowd et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2018).
Chapters 1-3 that follow are structured like regular journal articles, each with its own
introduction, conclusion, list of references and appendix. A concluding chapter briefly
considers some of their limitations and implications. An estimate of my contribution to
each of the chapters is found in the appendix to the dissertation.
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Chapter 1
Raising the bar: minimum wages and employers’
hiring standards
Author: Sebastian Butschek
Abstract: This paper investigates whether the 2015 introduction of a statutory minimum
wage in Germany made a sample of 1,491 private-sector employers hire more selectively.
My difference-in-differences analysis compares the evolution of realized hiring standards
across establishments treated and untreated by the reform. I proxy hiring standards by
establishments’ minimum hire quality. As a measure of hire quality I use worker effects
from two-way fixed-effect log wage regressions estimated before my period of analysis,
which capture both observed and unobserved ability. To classify employers as treated I
rely on their pre-reform wage structure: whether or not they employed sub-minimum wage
workers. I find that in response to the minimum wage introduction, treated establishments
hired more productive workers: the relative increase in new hires’ minimum hire quality is
18.9% of a standard deviation. Using pre-reform survey information on screening intensity
I show that the effect is increasing in the importance of screening to the establishment’s
hiring process. This strengthens my interpretation of the effect on minimum hire quality
as a change in employers’ hiring standards.
Keywords: worker selection, hiring standard, screening, minimum wage, labor-labor
substitution.
JEL Codes: J23, J24, J31, J38, M51.
1.1 Introduction
The effects of minimum wages on hiring have been studied by labor economists for decades.
Scores of papers on the employment effects of minimum wages notwithstanding, very little
is known about how policy-mandated wage floors affect the composition of hires. Yet it
is plausible that a minimum wage could affect how selectively firms hire. If it has any
bite, a new minimum wage will exogenously make low-wage workers more expensive. For
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employers of sub-minimum wage workers, this may raise hiring standards: to ensure new
hires remain profitable for them, firms may require greater productivity of applicants for
low-wage jobs. Despite the scarcity of evidence, it is important to understand if worker
selection is a channel of employer adjustment to minimum wages. Firms hiring more selec-
tively in response to a minimum wage may have significant distributional consequences for
job-seekers. Workers with the lowest productivity may experience an increased likelihood
of getting stuck in unemployment, even in the absence of negative aggregate employment
effects of minimum wages.
In this paper I provide some of the first causal evidence on the effect of a minimum wage
on employers’ hiring standards by studying the 2015 introduction of a statutory minimum
wage (SMW) in Germany. Exploiting variation in pre-reform wage structure, I compare
establishments treated by the SMW introduction to untreated ones. Using a differences-in-
differences (DiD) framework, I estimate the effect of the reform on minimum hire quality,
my proxy for employers’ hiring standards. Minimum hire quality is based on estimated
person fixed effects, a measure of time-invariant productivity that captures both observed
and unobserved skills. My results suggest that the hiring of German establishments became
more selective in response to the SMW introduction: the reform increased minimum hire
quality by 18.9% of a standard deviation.
My empirical analysis uses administrative data for 2010-2016 on the entire workforces of
1,491 establishments representative of the German private sector (excluding establishments
with fewer than 50 workers). To assign establishments to the treated or control group I
construct a measure for their exposure to the minimum wage introduction. I classify those
employers as treated that employed sub-minimum wage workers in 2010-2013, before the
SMW introduction could have been anticipated. My preferred measure for SMW exposure
is binary for two reasons. First, establishments employing many minimum-wage workers
do not have an incentive to raise hiring standards further than employers with just a
few minimum-wage workers. Second, with a binary measure measurement error in SMW
exposure should bias my results towards zero whereas it may bias them away from zero
with a continuous minimum wage bite measure.
As a proxy for the productivity of new hires I utilize worker effects from a two-way
fixed-effects log-wage regression as introduced by Abowd et al. (1999)(henceforth AKM).
I use the AKM worker effects estimated for West Germany by Card et al. (2013) for the
period 2002-2009, ensuring that ability proxies are pre-determined for any new hires con-
sidered in my analysis. AKM worker effects capture those components of time-invariant
individual productivity that are reflected in workers’ wage earnings. This includes edu-
cation or vocational qualifications but extends to unobserved cognitive and non-cognitive
ability such as motivation or conscientiousness (Butschek and Sauermann, 2019b). For the
purpose of estimating the effect of an SMW introduction on hiring standards I view AKM
worker effects as a more appropriate productivity measure than observed proxies (such as
8
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age or years of schooling). The first reason is that AKM worker effects vary continuously
while the level of schooling is measured in coarse categories—possibly too coarse to cap-
ture the adjustment of hiring standards to a minimum wage. The second reason is that
AKM worker effects should be more informative of productivity in low-wage jobs than age
or schooling: it is not clear that older or more highly educated individuals have higher
performance behind the cashier or on a lawnmower.
I first show that my measure of SMW exposure is relevant: the 2015 SMW introduction
increased bottom starting wages by EUR 6.56 per day. Next I estimate the DiD effect of
the SMW introduction on minimum hire quality, finding an increase of 18.9% of a standard
deviation. I then estimate an event-study version of the DiD specification and find that the
positive effect on hiring standards is already present in 2014, when the SMW was widely
anticipated, and persists through 2016.
There are some threats to identification, which I address in turn. First, if the reform
reduced the share of new hires whose ability I can measure this may spuriously produce
the pattern I attribute to a shift of hiring standards. A similar argument applies to groups
of workers whose ability may be systematically underestimated by AKM worker effects,
such as women and young workers. I show that the reform did not significantly affect
the share of hires for whom I have an AKM worker effect, nor the share of women or the
age of hires. Second, despite parallel pre-reform trends minimum hire quality in treated
and control establishments may have evolved differently post-reform even in the absence of
the SMW introduction. As treated employers pay lower wages than untreated ones I run
placebo tests that compare untreated establishments with lower average wages to untreated
establishments with higher average wages. There are no significant placebo effects of the
reform, providing suggestive evidence for parallel counter-factual post-reform trends.
To strengthen my interpretation that the SMW effect on minimum hire quality reflects
a raising of employers’ hiring standards I confront two alternative interpretations of the
result. First, the increase in minimum hire quality may be a mechanical consequence of
a drop in establishments’ hiring rate. If employers hired significantly fewer workers each
year, this would reduce the spread of the ability distribution of new hires. An implication
is that maximum hire quality should drop, which I do not find. In addition, the SMW
introduction did not significantly reduce the hiring rate in my sample.
Second, rather than reflecting an adjustment of qualitative labor demand, the increase
in minimum hire quality may be driven by better workers sorting into treated establish-
ments. I look at voluntary movers coming from high-wage employers to test for changes
in worker self-selection and find no evidence for it. Moreover, I show that the SMW effect
on minimum hire quality is more pronounced for establishments where survey evidence
suggests that pre-hire screening plays a bigger role. That employers for whom screening is
more feasible respond more strongly supports my interpretation that the SMW effect on
minimum hire quality is due to hiring becoming more selective.
9
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The two defining features of this paper are its focus on the minimum wage’s effect on
hiring standards and on a worker quality measure that captures unobserved productivity.
There are three existing papers that also address the link between minimum wages and
employers’ hiring standards. First, using a survey of restaurant managers, Hirsch et al.
(2015) find that a federal minimum wage hike increased self-reported intentions of hiring
older and more experienced workers (though no positive effect on hire age materialized).
Second, Gu¨rtzgen et al. (2016) descriptively compare survey information on firms’ hir-
ing criteria from before and after the German SMW introduction I also study, finding
that these criteria became stricter.1 Unlike these two papers, my analysis does not use
management-reported information but relies on inferring employers’ hiring standards from
the ability of realized hires. This makes my proxy more informative of effective changes
in hiring standards than the intentions stated in a survey. Third, a recent working pa-
per by Clemens et al. (2018) pursues an alternative way of providing revealed-preference
evidence on hiring standards: they use data from job postings to show that employers’
advertised hiring criteria became stricter in response to federal minimum wage increases in
the US. In further contrast to Clemens et al. (2018) I employ an ability measure that varies
continuously and captures not just observed human capital but also unobserved cognitive
and non-cognitive ability. Reassuringly, our independent studies produce consistent and
complementary results. Though based on different measures of worker skill and strategies
for identifying employer hiring standards, both find a positive minimum wage effect on the
selectiveness of hiring.
More generally, this paper is related to a small empirical literature on labor-labor
substitution as a channel of firm adjustment to minimum wages. That literature almost
exclusively uses observed characteristics such as age or schooling as proxies for worker skill.2
It produces mixed evidence. The findings of some papers are consistent with substitution
toward higher-skilled workers: Neumark and Wascher (1995) find that state-level minimum
wage increases in the US were associated with teenage transition patterns between school,
work and unemployment hinting at substitution toward higher-quality teenage labor. The
analysis of a living wage ordinance for Los Angeles city contractors in Fairris and Bujanda
(2008) shows that more workers hired after the wage mandate had pre-hire formal training
than incumbents hired before. Bernini and Riley (2016) present evidence that increases
of the UK National Minimum Wage were associated with occupational shifts among new
hires toward more skill-intensive production. This suggestive evidence is strengthened by
1Fairris and Bujanda (2008) also have a direct survey item on whether employers raised hiring standards
in response to a Los Angeles living-wage ordinance. However, they cannot use it as a regression outcome
as all surveyed firms were equally affected by the wage floor.
2An exception is Fairris and Bujanda (2008). While they cannot provide a causal estimate, their descrip-
tive case study of a living wage and labor-labor substitution looks at past wages conditional on observables
as a proxy for unobserved worker ability. Conceptually, using past wages as an outcome while controlling
for worker and past employer characteristics is similar to the AKM method.
10
MINIMUM WAGES AND HIRING STANDARDS
Clemens et al. (2018), who find that state-level minimum wage hikes in the US led to
substitution away from high-school dropouts and younger workers.
More papers, though using similar skill proxies, find no evidence of substitution toward
higher-skilled workers along observed dimensions. Several do not support substitution
away from the young (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006; Fairris and Bujanda, 2008; Giuliano,
2013; Hirsch et al., 2015; Cengiz et al., 2019). Some also look at schooling, where results
do not support substitution away from those with low education (Fairris and Bujanda,
2008; Hirsch et al., 2015; Cengiz et al., 2019). In addition, Fairris and Bujanda (2008)
find no indication of substitution toward more experienced workers. While labor-labor
substitution along observed dimensions is not the focus of this paper, my results on this
are in line with the latter group of papers. I find no significant effect of the German SMW
on the share of hires with low education or out of unemployment nor on the age of hires.3
My empirical analysis is also relevant to theoretical macro work on the role of firm
search for the formation of matches in the labor market. For example, several papers show
that including screening in matching models alters the predictions for aggregate labor
market behaviour with respect to cyclicality or in response to regulation (Villena-Rolda´n,
2012; Wolthoff, 2017). My paper lends support to these papers by providing evidence
that screening plays a significant role in match formation. Other theoretical studies have
explicitly modelled the impact of regulatory changes in a matching framework (Pries and
Rogerson, 2005; Brochu and Green, 2013; Sengul, 2017). Their predictions for minimum
wage effects on hiring standards are closely related to the hypothesis I test in this paper.4
One potential implication of my results is that the SMW makes it more difficult for
the least productive job-seekers to find employment. Given that boosting the incomes of
low-wage workers is a key objective behind introducing an SMW, this is an undesired side
effect. It would be misguided however to conclude from this that the minimum wage does
more damage than good. Rather, my finding points to a potential need to provide extra
support to the losers from the minimum wage’s effect on worker selection.
1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section I look at ways of formalizing the intuition behind the paper. My first
step is to model a firm’s decision whether or not to hire a worker in the most simplified
set-up possible. I then review the predictions of existing papers that analyze the effect
3In this, my results differ from those of Clemens et al. (2018). One potential explanation is that being a
high-school drop-out in the US is a stronger negative signal than having neither an Abitur (the high school
diploma required for university entry in Germany) nor a vocational qualification is in Germany. Another
explanation is that the effect on hiring standards with respect to observed characteristics is too small for
me to detect with the statistical power my sample affords. Finally, note that even recent US evidence is
ambiguous (e.g., Clemens et al., 2018; Cengiz et al., 2019).
4In Section 1.2 I use a toy model to formalize the intuition that minimum wages may raise hiring
standards and discuss predictions from existing theoretical work.
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of minimum wages on firms’ hiring thresholds in search-and-matching frameworks, though
their predictions refer to match productivity rather than worker ability.
1.2.1 A toy model
Consider a firm that uses only labor to produce a good, which it sells at price p = 1. The
firm’s output depends solely on the ability a of its single worker, where a ∼ N(ma, σ2a).
Before production starts, the firm receives an application from one worker. If it hires the
worker, it has to pay her the market wage w, which is exogenously given and independent
of ability. The firm then produces and sells all of its output. If the firm does not hire
the worker, it produces zero output and incurs no costs. Thus the firm’s profit is given by
Π(a,w) = a− w if it hires the applicant and by Π(a,w) = 0 otherwise.
When ability is perfectly observed, the firm will hire the worker if a ≥ w. Similarly,
when a is unobserved but its distribution is known, the firm will make a hire if ma ≥ w.
Now consider the case when a is imperfectly observed and the firm receives a noisy
ability signal z = a + , where  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) and  is uncorrelated with ability. The firm
will hire the worker if, conditional on the ability signal, expected profits are non-negative:
E[Π|z] = ma + σ
2
a
σ2a + σ
2

(z −ma)− w ≥ 0 (1.1)
or, equivalently, if the ability signal is weakly greater than the hiring threshold t:
z ≥ 1
σ2a
[(σ2a + σ
2
 )w − σ2ma] = t. (1.2)
This threshold goes up when the wage is increased (such as by a minimum wage intro-
duction that bites):
dt
dw
=
σ2a + σ
2

σ2a
> 0. (1.3)
This toy model formalizes the intuition that when workers become more expensive,
firms’ hiring becomes more selective. It yields the prediction tested in this paper that the
introduction of a biting minimum wage will increase firms’ hiring thresholds.5 See Section
1.7.1 in the appendix for the proofs.
5In my empirical analyses I proxy the hiring threshold (the lowest ability signal the firm would tolerate)
with my ability measure for the least productive new hire, which is not exactly the same. Note, however,
that the expected ability of a new hire with z = t is simply the wage and thus will also go up when a
minimum wage is introduced.
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1.2.2 Theoretical predictions from the literature
Pries and Rogerson (2005) introduce screening to the hiring process. They consider a
matching model with employer learning that treats the quality of the worker-firm match
as both an inspection and an experience good. In their framework, employers hire workers
when the match productivity signal they receive is above a certain threshold. Studying
the impact of various types of regulation in this set-up they predict that a minimum wage
increase will raise firms’ hiring thresholds. Brochu and Green (2013) also model screening
in a matching model with endogenous separations. They, too, obtain the analytical pre-
diction that, under some reasonable conditions, minimum wages will increase the hiring
standard. Both Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Brochu and Green (2013) model screening
as costless to the firm. Sengul (2017) relaxes the assumption that screening is costless
and explicitly models firms’ choice of screening. She also gets the analytical result that
increases in minimum wages increase the threshold value of the match productivity sig-
nal. The mapping of these models’ predictions to the hypothesis tested in this paper is
imperfect in the sense that they all view workers as ex-ante homogeneous. That is, ex-
post match productivity differs across worker-firm matches but ex-ante worker ability does
not. It is reassuring that the set-up I consider above—which is highly simplified but uses
heterogeneous workers—yields a similar prediction for the ability signal threshold.
1.3 Institutional setting and data
1.3.1 Policy shock: statutory minimum wage introduction
Germany’s statutory minimum wage (SMW) was set at EUR 8.50 per hour (gross) and
came into effect on 1 January 2015. It applied to all of Germany’s federal states (La¨nder)
equally, irrespective of prior regional differences in wage levels.6 Certain groups of workers
were temporarily exempted:
 Apprentices for the duration of their vocational training, teenagers up to their 18th
birthday and interns for a maximum duration of three months.
 The long-term unemployed for the first six months of their new job.7
 Employees subject to a pre-existing sectoral minimum wage set below the new SMW,
for a one-year transition period ending on 31 December 2015.
6How many workers would benefit from the SMW was the subject of considerable debate in 2014. Its
bite in my sample of employers will be discussed in Section 1.5.
7The law adopted a strict definition of long-term unemployment: it applied only to individuals entering
employment who had been unemployed for at least a year without interruption.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of minimum wage introduction
01/01/2010–21/09/2013
Pre-reform
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02/05/2013–31/12/2014
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01/07/2014–31/04/2016
Post-reform
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Anticipation The timing of the SMW introduction is sketched in Figure 1.1. Though
the statutory minimum wage was written into law in August 2014, its introduction was
widely anticipated earlier, most likely from the end of 2013 on. By December 2013, the
general election of 22 September 2013 had resulted in a grand coalition between the Con-
servatives (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The SPD—the junior coalition
partner—had managed to push into the coalition agreement its election manifesto pledge
of a statutory minimum wage of EUR 8.50.8 In this the SPD had triumphed over the
Conservatives, who in their election manifesto had rejected a statutory minimum wage,
instead promoting additional sector- and region-specific minimum wages agreed by col-
lective bargaining. As the Conservatives had been favoured to win the general election,
it was difficult to anticipate the introduction of a statutory minimum wage prior to the
general election, i.e., earlier than 22 September 2013.9 This view is supported by Figure
1.2, which shows an index of Google web searches for “Mindestlohn” (minimum wage) in
Germany over time: the graph remains broadly flat from 2010 through the general election
of September 2013, when it starts rising.
Concurrent policy changes The timing of Germany’s SMW introduction on 1 Jan-
uary 2015 coincided with only one other labor market reform: the Pflegesta¨rkungsgesetz
granted workers the right to ten days of unpaid vacation if they were unexpectedly forced
to care for a relative. During this time they would receive a government transfer (Pflegeun-
terstu¨tzungsgeld). This is a rather marginal policy change unlikely to have interacted with
the SMW introduction. Policy changes that became effective at other times in 2014 and
2015 made pensions more generous (July 2014), increased the social transfers to asylum
seekers (March 2015) and ended the requirement that asylum seekers only be considered
for jobs if no EU nationals are available. In addition, an option of doubling the duration of
8The result of the SPD’s internal vote on the coalition agreement was announced on 14 December 2013.
9Newspapers reported at the end of May 2013 that Chancellor Merkel had reaffirmed her rejection
of an SMW (https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/tagung-in-muenster-merkel-bekraeftigt-
nein-zum-gesetzlichen-mindestlohn/8253832.html, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/union-zum-
gesetzlichen-mindestlohn-merkel-lehnt-forderung-der-cda-ab-a-901892.html). Only at the end of October
were there reports that if a Grand Coalition came to pass it would likely introduce an SMW (see, e.g.,
https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-10/mindestlohn-auswirkungen-arbeitsmarkt).
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Figure 1.2: Timing of minimum wage introduction
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paid parental leave by combining it with part-time work was introduced (July 2015). The
only one of these reforms that may threaten to affect the quality of hires is the reduction
of employment barriers for asylum seekers. However, it is unlikely that this loosening will
confound the results of the minimum wage as it made it easier for all employers to hire
(potentially more qualified) asylum seekers, not just for those establishments affected by
the minimum wage.10
1.3.2 Data source
My main data source is the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). These data are
provided by FDZ, the research data centre of the German Federal Employment Agency’s
research institute (IAB). The IEB are longitudinal individual-level spell data that are as-
sembled from social security records. They contain information on workers’ age, gender,
education, qualification, occupation, industry, the timing of entry into and exit from em-
ployment, and total (annual) earnings from each employment spell. There are person and
establishment identifiers allowing me to follow individuals over time and to observe who
is employed at the same establishment. The data do not contain firm identifiers. As a
consequence, several observed establishments may be part of the same company but I will
not know.
The data underlying my empirical analysis are a flow sample of the workforces of 1,520
German establishments for the period from 2010 through 2016. That is, they contain
information on all individuals ever formally employed at these establishments during those
seven years, even if only for a day. The sample of establishments is representative for the
10In practice, a bias from the liberalization of the German labor market for asylum seekers is ruled out
by my measure of individual productivity: AKM worker effects are only available for individuals who have
been in regular employment in Germany before. See Section 1.4.3 for details.
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German private sector by size, industry and region strata, but excluding establishments
that employ fewer than 50 workers. As the empirical analysis is at the establishment level
I aggregate individual-level spell information in establishment-year cells.
I use the employment records of full-time, part-time and marginal workers and exclude
the remaining groups such as interns, apprentices and people in a part-time transition to
retirement. The resulting sample includes 4,913,135 observations for 918,056 workers at
1,520 establishments. Most relevant for my analysis of firm’s selectiveness in hiring is the
sample of worker inflows during 2010-16. This hire sample includes 448,013 observations
for 440,813 workers at 1,512 establishments.
The final analysis sample is at the establishment-year level and includes the 1,491
establishments for which I can measure pre-reform minimum wage exposure and hire quality
in at least one year.11
1.4 Method
1.4.1 Identification strategy
To estimate how employers adjusted the selectiveness of their hiring to the introduction of
the minimum wage I look for a group of establishments that were untreated by the policy
change but similar in their hiring behaviour. I use the following difference-in-differences
(DiD) specification:
yjt = α+ βTRj ∗ POSTt + γt + δj + jt, (1.4)
where I assign establishment j to the treated group (TRj = 1) if it pays one or more
workers strictly less than the future minimum wage in the pre-reform years (before policy
anticipation is possible). The control group consists of all establishments that do not em-
ploy any minimum-wage workers in the pre-reform period. The pre-reform period includes
the years 2010-2013; the post-reform period, POSTt = 1, is 2015-2016. I drop observations
for the year 2014 from this DiD specification: in this year, the minimum wage is not yet
effective but there may already be an anticipation effect on hiring behaviour. There are
fixed effects for years, γt, and establishments, δj . Beyond using establishment fixed effects
to control for time-invariant heterogeneity I do not include co-variates. yjt measures es-
tablishments’ hiring standards (see Section 1.4.3 fur further detail). The DiD coefficient
βˆ provides an estimate of the effect of the minimum wage introduction on establishments’
worker selection. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.12
11The hire quality data I use are also provided by IAB. See Section 1.4.3 for details.
12Some papers applying a similar identification strategy weight regressions with log employment (see,
e.g., Harasztosi and Lindner, 2018). I show in the appendix that doing so leaves my results qualitatively
unchanged (see Figure 1.6).
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The key identifying assumption is E [jt|TRj ∗ POSTt] = 0: the selectiveness of hiring
in treated and untreated establishments follows parallel counter-factual trends, i.e., would
have been parallel in the entire analysis period if the minimum wage had not been intro-
duced.13 I can directly test whether this holds only for the pre-reform years by considering
an event-study version of the DiD specification:
yjt = α+
∑
t
(βtTRj ∗ γt) + γt + δj + jt. (1.5)
Now βt is a year-specific DiD coefficient and 2013 is the reference year. Parallel pre-reform
trends in outcomes would mean that βˆt is not significantly different from zero for 2010-
2012. Anticipation effects of the minimum wage would show up as βˆt=2014 different from
zero. βˆt for 2015-2016 provides estimates of the minimum wage’s short-run effect. While it
is impossible to test for parallel counter-factual trends in the post-reform period a placebo
analysis in Section 1.6.1 provides suggestive evidence in their support.
1.4.2 Measuring establishment minimum wage exposure
My empirical strategy compares establishments treated by the minimum wage introduction
to untreated establishments. I use establishments’ pre-reform wage structure to determine
their exposure to the SMW. My measure for SMW exposure is an indicator for whether
any of the establishment’s workers earned less than the future SMW (deflated using the
CPI) in the years 2010-2013, when the minimum wage was not anticipated. As such,
this dummy varies at the establishment level (but not over time). I follow Harasztosi
and Lindner (2018) in averaging SMW exposure over the pre-reform period.14 There is a
theoretical motivation for my focus on a binary measure for SMW exposure rather than,
e.g., the fraction of sub-SMW workers or a wage gap measure: I am looking for a shift in
employers’ hiring thresholds. If an establishment’s lowest-paid workers exogenously become
more expensive and this raises its hiring standard, recruitment should avoid workers with
a productivity below the threshold - irrespective of whether the minimum wage bites for
just a handful or many of its workers.15
The minimum wage sets a EUR 8.50 floor for hourly wages. The IEB data contain av-
erage daily wages but not hours worked. I therefore approximate hourly wages by focusing
on establishments’ full-time workers and dividing their daily wages by 8, the length of a
standard working day in Germany. This means that my SMW exposure measure does not
consider establishments’ part-time workers and mini jobbers. This may be problematic if
13See Section 1.7.2 in the appendix for a discussion of a further, more subtle, assumption.
14Column (4) of Table 1.8 in the appendix shows measuring SMW exposure only in July 2013 produces
qualitatively similar results.
15In fact, if there are frictions in the hiring process, it is more difficult to shift the hiring standard up for
establishments using more sub-MW workers. While a continuous MW exposure measure is thus theoretically
less appealing it produces broadly similar results—see Column (2) of Table 1.8 in the appendix.
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SMW exposure is measured with more error at establishments more heavily affected by
the minimum wage, as may be the case if these establishments also employ a higher share
of part-timers or mini jobbers. Indeed there is evidence that the share of minimum wage
earners is particularly high among these groups, highlighting this concern (Machin et al.,
2003). I next discuss how I deal with the potential bias arising from this.
Limiting non-classical measurement error In this section I argue that focusing on a
binary, extensive-margin measure for SMW exposure helps me to limit potential biases from
non-classical measurement error. First consider treated establishments. The share of part-
timers and mini jobbers is higher at treated than at untreated establishments, as Table 1.1
shows. Existing evidence suggests that a greater share of part-timers and mini jobbers than
of full-timers earn below the minimum wage (Machin et al., 2003). At the intensive margin,
this would make me underestimate the SMW bite more at treated establishments. With the
extensive-margin exposure measure, however, treated establishments are correctly classified
even if I ignore part-timers and mini jobbers. I will mis-classify some establishments as
untreated - namely the ones where full-timers earn above the minimum wage but part-
timers or mini jobbers earn below it. Note, however, that falsely assigning some treated
employers to the control group in this way should bias my estimates towards zero. This
is how using an extensive-margin measure for SMW exposure should help me to avoid
overestimating the SMW effect.
I attempt to go one step further in reducing measurement error by using supplementary
information on individual hours for a sub-set of my data. These data come from the German
accident insurance. The hours data have hardly been used for scientific purposes because of
a number of reasons: (1) they are available only for the years 2010-2014; (2) they contain a
substantial share of missing values; (3) they contain either contractual, actual or estimated
working hours, but it is unknown which of the three. When investigating questions at the
individual level, the third point can be addressed by applying establishment fixed effects
and assuming that reporting differences within employers are negligible, making within-
establishment comparisons valid. In my setting, however, it is precisely the differences (in
hourly wages) across establishments that I am interested in. Relying on hours data that
report different things across establishments will thus almost certainly introduce additional
noise, which is why I view it as a robustness check. Column (3) of Table 1.8 in the appendix
shows that my main results remain qualitatively similar when I use the supplementary
hours data to compute hourly wages for the construction of an SMW exposure measure.
1.4.3 Measuring employers’ hiring standards
I measure establishment j’s hiring standard using the ability of its least productive new
hire i in a given year t, minj,t{abilityi}. The idea behind focusing on the bottom of the
new hire productivity distribution is to be able to detect the shift of employers’ hiring
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thresholds predicted by my toy model in Section 1.2. In addition, the minimum wage has
the largest bite for the lowest-earning workers, so that I expect its effect on worker selection
to be concentrated in the left tail of the new hire ability distribution.16
Underlying minj,t{abilityi} is a measure of individual worker productivity.17 For this I
use estimated worker effects from a two-way fixed-effects log-wage regression as introduced
by Abowd et al. (1999).18 These AKM worker effects capture the portion of workers’ time-
invariant productivity that is reflected in their wage earnings, including not only observable
human capital but also typically unobserved aspects of productivity. Among Swedish
workers in the 2000s, for example, AKM worker effects detect significant variation in both
non-cognitive and cognitive ability even conditional on the level of education (Butschek
and Sauermann, 2019b). For the purpose of measuring employers’ hiring standards it is an
advantage that AKM worker effects (a) vary continuously and (b) can distinguish between
the ability of workers with the same level of schooling. Educational qualifications alone may
be too coarse to differentiate between the productivity of very low-paid workers. They may
also be less relevant for performance in a minimum wage job than, e.g., conscientiousness,
reliability or common sense.
I use the AKM worker effects estimated by Card et al. (2013) for the interval 2002-2009.
CHK implement the following AKM specification:
ln (wijt) = αi + ψj + γt + x
′
itβ + rijt, (1.6)
where ln (wijt) is the natural logarithm of individual i’s wage at establishment j in year
t. There are additive fixed effects for individuals (αi) and establishments (ψj) as well
as a vector of time-varying individual-level controls (xit), including age squared and age
cubed as well as education categories interacted with the year dummies, age squared and
age cubed. Using the largest connected set of establishments in West Germany and the
universe of workers employed there during the interval from 2002 to 2009, CHK estimate
Equation (1.6) separately for men and women.
Matching CHK’s worker effect estimates with my sample of 2010-16 hires gives me an
individual ability measure for 38.86% of hired workers.19 However, I observe an ability
measure for at least one hire at 99.01% of establishments. Measuring ability of only a
16Despite the theoretical appeal of using minimum hire quality as a proxy for hiring standards one may
be worried that the minimum makes the analysis vulnerable to outliers. In Section 1.7.3 of the appendix I
also look at the SMW’s effect on P10, P25 and the median. Reassuringly, the effect is also positive for these
aggregations but becomes smaller and turns insignificant as one moves up the hire quality distribution—see
Table 1.9.
17I use the words ability and productivity interchangeably.
18Estimated individual fixed effects have gained some popularity as a broad measure of worker quality,
see the review in Butschek and Sauermann (2019b).
19One reason for the low individual-level coverage is that CHK’s estimates are only for West Germany.
In a robustness check I use a preliminary update of CHK’s AKM worker effects that includes East German
workers. This expands individual coverage to 51.58% of hired workers and produces similar results (see
Figure 1.7 in the appendix).
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subset of hires would be problematic if this selectively affected treated employers after the
reform. I explore this issue in Section 1.6.1.
1.4.4 Summary statistics
Table 1.1: Firm characteristics by treatment status
A: Continuous characteristics
Treated Control
mean sd mean sd
Head count (1 Jan) 362.629 1477.994 154.849 184.199
Establishment age (yrs) 21.977 11.682 21.080 11.605
Female worker share 0.349 0.251 0.259 0.217
Mean worker age 42.285 3.920 43.930 3.296
Mean wage 94.481 31.903 117.158 25.494
Part-time worker share 0.181 0.220 0.117 0.167
Mini-job worker share 0.064 0.111 0.030 0.070
Mean daily starting wage (EUR) 79.307 26.309 99.785 23.438
Hire rate 0.255 0.414 0.147 0.302
Hire share with AKM FE 0.387 0.200 0.431 0.236
Observations 1,147 344
B: Binary characteristics
Treated Control
Share Yes Frequency Share Yes Frequency
Manufacturing 0.295 338 0.358 123
Metal, electrical, automotive 0.251 288 0.328 113
Trade, transport, news 0.155 178 0.157 54
Business/financial services 0.177 203 0.087 30
Information, communication 0.122 140 0.070 24
Former East Germany 0.307 352 0.291 100
Observations 1,147 344
Note: This table summarizes treatment and control establishments’ average pre-reform characteristics for the main
estimation sample. Panel A provides mean and standard deviation of continuous variables. Panel B gives means and
frequencies for dummy variables.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics from 2013 for the estimation sample separately
for treated and control establishments. Panel A reports means and standard deviations
for continuous characteristics. The average treated establishment is larger and employs a
greater share of women, part-time workers and mini jobbers. At treated establishments
the mean wage is 19.3% lower, the mean starting wage is 20.5% lower and the hiring rate is
larger. Panel B gives the share and number of establishments that display certain binary
characteristics. The share in manufacturing as well as in metal, electrical and automotives
is smaller among treated establishments. Their share in business or financial services and
information and communication is bigger. Their share in trade, transport and news is
similar, as is their share located in former East Germany. Note that those establishment
characteristics that are not endogenous to the reform—i.e., mostly industry and location—
are relatively time-invariant and will be captured by the establishment fixed effects in the
regression specifications.
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1.5 Main results
I start with a plausibility test of my minimum wage exposure measure. That is, I test
whether the SMW introduction had any bite for those establishments I identify as treated.
If so, it should increase the wages establishments pay their lowest-earning new hires. Figure
1.3 presents the yearly DiD coefficients βˆt from estimating the event-study regressions in
Equation (1.5) with establishments’ minimum starting wages as an outcome. 2013 is the
reference year. The DiD estimates for 2010-2012 are indistinguishable from zero, confirming
the validity of the parallel-trends assumption for the pre-reform period. The 2014 coefficient
shows that there is no significant anticipation of the minimum wage introduction in the
bottom starting wages employers pay. Reassuringly, starting wages react positively to the
introduction of the minimum wage at treated establishments.
Figure 1.3: Minimum wage effect on minimum starting wages: event study
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum starting
wages (daily, in EUR). Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than
year dummies. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment
level.
Having established that the minimum wage had a bite for those establishments that
I assign to the treated group I move on to the central question whether the minimum
wage introduction made employers hire more selectively. To estimate the dynamic effects
on minimum hire quality I again start with the fixed-effects event-study framework from
Equation (1.5). Figure 1.4 presents the estimation results, revealing a persistent positive
effect of the 2015 minimum wage introduction of nearly 20 per cent of a standard deviation.
It also shows a significant anticipation effect in 2014. This suggests that employers already
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factored higher future wages into their recruitment decisions the year before the minimum
wage was binding. For the pre-reform period, the DiD estimates are closely centred around
zero, providing evidence in support of parallel pre-reform trends.
Figure 1.4: Minimum wage effect on minimum hire quality: event study
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum hire
quality. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies.
Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated 2002-2009. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Table 1.2 condenses the results from Figures 1.3 and 1.4 by reporting before-vs-after
DiD estimates (see Equation (1.4)). Here I exclude data from the year 2014 to make sure
my estimates do not capture anticipation effects. Column (1) shows that the statutory
minimum wage increases new hires’ minimum daily pay by about EUR 6.60. As illustrated
by Column (2), minimum hire quality also increased, by about 18.9 per cent of a standard
deviation. The remainder of this paper investigates whether this increase in minimum hire
quality can indeed be attributed to employers hiring more selectively.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Threats to identification
Systematic ability mis-measurement The individual ability measure used in this
paper, estimated AKM worker fixed effects, doubtlessly contains substantial measurement
error. Thanks to the DiD-strategy, however, even non-classical measurement error will
only lead to an overestimation of the effect of the minimum wage on worker selection
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Table 1.2: Minimum wage effect on starting wages and hire quality
(1) (2)
Starting wages Hire quality
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 6.5550*** 0.1888***
(1.2219) (0.0496)
Observations 8,288 7,591
Establishments 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0234 0.0150
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
is minimum starting wage (1) and minimum hire quality (2), where hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual
AKM worker effects estimated 2002-2009. Estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without
covariates other than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
under very specific conditions. This would be the case if pre-determined ability had been
systematically overestimated for new hires entering treated establishments after the reform,
i.e., if the bias of the individual ability estimate were correlated with where and when the
individual is eventually hired. This is highly unlikely: the AKM worker effect used in the
2010-2016 analysis period is estimated using a non-overlapping earlier period (2002-2009)
and is necessarily based on employment at other establishments than the one eventually
hiring the worker.
Instead a potential threat to identification stems from the aggregation of individual
ability measures to the firm level. As detailed in Section 1.4.3 I do not have an AKM
worker effect estimate for all new hires. If a smaller share of hires were observed at treated
establishments after the reform, I might mechanically overestimate minimum hire quality.
Such selective attrition may produce the same pattern as a change in the selectiveness of
hiring. I test for the presence of selective attrition by using the share of new hires for
whom an estimated AKM worker effect is available as an outcome. Column (1) of Table
1.3 suggests that the reform had no significant effect on the proportion of new hires for
whom I have an ability measure, allaying concerns about selective attrition.
Table 1.3: Minimum wage effect on availability of hire quality measure
(1) (2) (3)
AKM coverage Female hires Hire age
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 0.0020 -0.0105 0.2691
(0.0117) (0.0093) (0.2838)
Observations 8,473 8,473 8,473
Establishments 1,491 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0952 0.0003 0.0112
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. In all columns the
dependent variable reflects certain characteristics of establishments’ new hires: in (1) the share of hires for whom
an AKM worker effect is available; in (2) the female hire share; and in (3) new hires’ average age. DiD estimates
are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year dummies. The year 2014 is
excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
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A related threat arises from the possibility that AKM worker effects systematically
under-estimate individual ability for certain groups and that the minimum wage leads to
fewer members of these groups being hired. This combination of a shift in the composition
of hires and systematic mis-measurement for the newly under-represented groups may drive
observed minimum hire quality up at treated establishments without the increase in hiring
standards I am attempting to identify. I can test this possibility for two groups: women and
younger workers. First, to the extent that there is still some discrimination against women
in the labor market AKM worker effects may underestimate ability for women relative
to men. It is therefore reassuring that the minimum wage did not significantly reduce
the share of women hired (see Column (2) of Table 1.3). Second, there is evidence that
AKM worker effects underestimate ability for younger workers (Butschek and Sauermann,
2019b). Column (3) of Table 1.3 suggests, however, that this is unlikely to drive my results
as the minimum wage did not significantly increase hires’ average age.
Non-parallel counter-factual trends While the pre-reform trends in outcomes are
parallel in the treatment and control groups, it is possible that minimum hire quality of
treated and untreated establishments would have diverged (or converged) in the absence
of the minimum wage introduction. The identifying assumption of parallel counter-factual
trends itself is untestable. It is possible, however, to use a placebo test as indirect evidence
for its plausibility. The variation in minimum wage exposure I use in this paper comes
from differences in establishment wage structures. I stick to this idea in constructing a
placebo treatment: using only employers untreated by the minimum wage, I split them
into two roughly equal-sized groups based on their average wages. Those establishments
with average wages below the median are assigned the placebo treatment and those with
average wages at the median or greater make up the placebo control group. Figure 1.5
reports the results from estimating event-study regressions of minimum hire quality on the
placebo treatment. There is no clear pattern to the yearly coefficient estimates βˆt and none
of them is significantly different from zero. I interpret this as indicative evidence for the
validity of the assumption of parallel counter-factual trends during the post-reform period.
1.6.2 Alternative interpretations
Mechanical effect of fewer hires An alternative to the firm selectiveness explanation
for the minimum wage effect on minimum hire quality is that a reduced number of hires
mechanically increased minimum hire quality. Suppose that employers hire randomly, not
screening workers at all. Then, hires into a given establishment are a random draw from
the overall ability distribution of available workers. If the hiring rate goes down, this
will reduce the ability dispersion of new hires, raising hire quality at the bottom of the
establishment hire quality distribution. But it will symmetrically reduce quality at the
top.
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Figure 1.5: Placebo effect on minimum hire quality: event study
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of a placebo treatment on minimum hire quality. Estimates
are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Establishments
affected by the actual treatment (minimum wage) are excluded. The placebo treatment is assigned to those untreated
establishments with below-median average wages. Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker
effects estimated 2002-2009. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level.
Thus, if the minimum wage substantially reduced the number of hires, this may have
mechanically increased minimum hire quality even with random hiring, delivering the em-
pirical pattern I have hitherto interpreted as evidence of raised hiring standards. In addi-
tion, if it operated mechanically through the number of hires, the minimum wage should
have reduced maximum hire quality. I test these predictions by estimating Equation (1.4)
with the number of hires and maximum hire quality as outcome variables. As Table 1.4
illustrates, I neither find a significant negative effect of the minimum wage on the number
of hires nor a significant reduction of maximum hire quality. This suggests that if the
mechanical effect of fewer hires is at play it is too small to be detectable with the available
statistical power. It is therefore an unlikely explanation for the effect of the minimum wage
on minimum hire quality.
Demand or supply So far in this paper I have interpreted the changes in minimum hire
quality induced by the introduction of the minimum wage as evidence of shifts in firm hiring
standards, i.e., a change in the demand for the quality of labor. In principle, however, they
could also have been driven by changes in self-selection of workers—i.e., the supply of the
quality of labor. Due to the minimum wage, a greater number of productive workers may
apply to employers treated by the minimum wage as these are now more attractive—their
wages (at least at the bottom) improve relative to those of untreated establishments.
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Table 1.4: Minimum wage effect on number of hires and maximum hire quality
(1) (2)
Number of hires Maximum hire quality
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -1.3134 -0.0135
(2.6061) (0.0480)
Observations 8,473 7,591
Establishments 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0033 0.0054
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
is the number of hires (1) and maximum hire quality (2), where hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM
worker effects estimated 2002-2009. Estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates
other than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
A first piece of evidence in favour of the labor demand or screening interpretation
comes from the literature. In a descriptive study of the evolution of establishmens’ hiring
criteria and job-filling success before and after the introduction of the German minimum
wage, Gu¨rtzgen et al. (2016) find that it becomes harder to fill low-wage vacancies. This
contradicts the possibility that higher-productivity workers more readily self-select into
formerly minimum-wage establishments.
To go further than this I look to empirical evidence. First I test for indications of a
change in worker self-selection. Ideally, one would have data on applicants rather than
hires.20 Lacking such information I consider a subset of hires for whom it is likely that
the workers self-selected into their new establishments—voluntary job changers—and check
whether the share of these coming from high-wage establishments goes up.21 I then use the
share of voluntary transitions from a high-wage establishment among new hires as a proxy
for establishment attractiveness in the regression framework from Equation (1.4). As Col-
umn (1) of Table 1.5 shows, the introduction of the minimum wage does not make treated
establishments significantly more attractive by this metric. This is a further indication
that worker self-selection does not drive the increase in minimum hire quality.
Second I attempt to identify more direct evidence for the screening channel. To this end
I distinguish employers by how feasible it is to screen workers. Depending on occupation,
production technology and task structure it will be more or less possible to ex-ante assess
worker productivity. Assuming that employers’ screening intensity in the pre-reform period
contains information about the feasibility of pre-hire screening, I use information from the
2012 wave of the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), an employer survey on human resource
management, to split the sample into low- and high-screening feasibility establishments.22
20It is tempting to use the LPP, an IAB survey data set on employer management practices, to look at
the number of applications. Unfortunately, this information is available only for skilled workers, who earn
above the minimum wage.
21To empirically identify voluntary job changes I use employment-to-employment (E-E) transitions with
an employment gap of less than thirty days. I define those as coming from a high-wage employer whose
previous employer’s estimated AKM establishment effect was in ventile 11 or higher.
22The idea is that when screening is (nearly) impossible, employers do not bother to invest much time,
deferring most worker assessment to on-the-job screening. If, on the other hand, it is possible to learn
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Table 1.5: Minimum wage effect on hire quality: worker self-selection and screening
feasibility
(1) (2) (3)
Estab. attractiveness Low feasibility High feasibility
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0023 0.0999 0.3065***
(0.0023) (0.0692) (0.0919)
Observations 8,473 3,608 2,233
Establishments 1,491 723 434
Adjusted R2 0.0008 0.0133 0.0195
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. The dependent
variable in (1) is the share of hires transitioning directly from employment at a high-wage firm (above-median AKM
firm effect). In (2) and (3) the dependent variable is minimum hire quality, with CHK’s individual AKM worker
effects estimated 2002-2009 used as a hire quality measure. (2) reports the estimated effect of the minimum wage
introduction on establishments with below-median screenability of new hires; (3) does the same for establishments
above the median. The proxy for screening feasibility is self-reported screening intensity for non-management hires in
hours, measured in 2012. DiD estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other
than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
If the reform-induced increase in minimum hire quality is due to employers raising their
hiring standards then this response should be more pronounced at establishments where
pre-hire screening is more feasible. As Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.5 show, the estimated
effect of the minimum wage on minimum hire quality is indeed bigger at establishments
where screening plays a bigger role.23 This is a final piece of evidence suggesting that
the change in minimum hire quality is a demand-side phenomenon, driven by a shift of
employers’ hiring standards.
1.6.3 Observed worker characteristics and statistical discrimination
The evidence presented so far suggests that the SMW introduction in Germany raised es-
tablishments’ hiring standards. A potential implication of increased employer selectiveness
is that vulnerable groups in the labor market find it harder to get hired. This would be
worrying, suggesting that some of the weakest labor market participants are hurt by a mea-
sure intended to improve their outcomes. To check if employers statistically discriminate
against vulnerable groups I estimate the SMW’s effect on the hire share of unemployed
and low-skill workers, where I follow CHK’s definition of low skill (education level lower
than Abitur and no vocational qualification). Table 1.6 presents the results of estimating
the DiD specification in Equation (1.4) for these outcomes.
There is no evidence that the minimum wage makes employers less likely to hire disad-
vantaged labor market participants along these observed dimensions. It may still be though
something substantial about the worker’s productivity before hiring them, it makes sense to ex-ante screen
for several hours and more. Based on this reasoning those with above-median screening intensity in 2012
are classified as employers where pre-hire screening is more feasible (see Figure 1.8 in the appendix for a
pre-hire screening histogram).
23Figure 1.9 in the appendix provides further support for this interpretation. Splitting the sample of
establishments at the pre-reform screening intensity quartiles, it suggests that the minimum wage effect on
hiring standards increases monotonically in the feasibility of screening.
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Table 1.6: Minimum wage effect on observable hire quality
(1) (2)
Unemployed Low-skill
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0009 0.0047
(0.0090) (0.0059)
Observations 8,473 8,473
Establishments 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0098 0.0402
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
is (1) the share among new hires of formerly unemployed workers and (2) workers that have neither a vocational
qualification nor a secondary school diploma that qualifies them for university entry (Abitur). DiD estimates are from
establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to
rule out anticipation effects.
that in terms of the unobserved characteristics captured by estimated AKM worker fixed
effects the least productive workers find it harder to find a job as the minimum wage makes
employers more selective.24
Is this a contradiction, given that unemployment and a lack of formal qualifications are
likely to be correlated with the ability captured in estimated AKM worker fixed effects? I
argue that it is not. It is plausible that among the very low-pay workers who may be close
to employers’ hiring standards observed characteristics are less useful for distinguishing
productivity on the job. This may be because, for example, educational qualifications are
largely irrelevant for productivity in a cleaning job. In addition, the observed characteristics
may be too coarse to differentiate between more and less able workers. One piece of evidence
in support of this is that the partial correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and
observed characteristics are lower among sub-minimum wage workers than among those
higher up the wage distribution, especially for the low-education dummy; the share of the
variance in AKM worker effects explained by low-skill and entry from unemployment is also
lower. This is illustrated by Table 1.11 in the appendix, which compares a regression of
AKM worker effects on observed characteristics between workers earning below and above
the SMW in the pre-reform period (2010-13).
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I study the effect of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany
on the hiring standards of 1,491 private-sector employers. My empirical strategy is a
difference-in-differences comparison of treated and untreated establishments, classified by
whether their wage structure prior to the reform exposed them to the introduction of the
24For consistency with my main analysis, I use the binary SMW exposure measure as described in Section
1.4.2. However, given that the outcome here is not the hiring threshold but the share of a particular group
among new hires, a continuous measure of SMW exposure is arguably more appropriate. Table 1.10 in the
appendix reproduces the analysis using a continuous SMW bite measure (the pre-reform share of sub-MW
workers). It also does not show a statistically significant effect of the SMW introduction on the share of
hires from unemployment or with low education.
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SMW. To identify employers’ hiring standards I do not rely on manager-reported intentions
or hiring criteria but on the quality of establishments’ realized hires, using the ability of
the least productive new hire in a year as a proxy for the hiring standard. The worker-level
data I use allows me to observe every single worker inflow during a period of four years pre-
reform and two years post-reform. Matching these with the AKM worker effects estimated
by Card et al. (2013) gives me an individual-level measure of time-invariant productivity.
Using AKM worker effects as ability proxies implies that I measure employers’ hiring
standards with respect to both observed and unobserved worker productivity.
My DiD estimate of the SMW introduction’s effect on establishments’ minimum hire
quality is an increase of 18.9% of a standard deviation. That this result identifies a causal
effect is primarily threatened by two scenarios. The first is selective attrition or mea-
surement, where the availability or accuracy of my worker ability proxy is systematically
different for treated establishments after the reform. I show that this is not the case.
The second potential threat is a deviation from parallel counter-factual trends after the
reform. I provide suggestive evidence that this is unlikely: a placebo test shows that trends
are roughly parallel between two groups of untreated employers that, like the treated and
control groups, differ in their pre-reform wage structure.
I also explore the possibility that while the reform’s effect on minimum hire quality is
real, it does not reflect an increase of employers’ hiring standards. There are two alternative
explanations I address: the first is that a reform-induced reduction in the hiring rate
mechanically increased establishments’ minimum hire quality by reducing the sample they
draw from the worker ability distribution. Such a mechanism requires a drop in the hiring
rate and implies a reduction in maximum hire quality. I find neither. The second alternative
interpretation is that a change in workers’ self-selection improved the applicant pool of
treated establishments. Thus a shift in the quality of labor supplied, rather than raised
hiring standards, could be driving the increase in minimum hire quality. I offer two pieces
of evidence supporting the interpretation that demand for a higher quality of labor is
the primary driver of my result. First, the share of voluntary job changers coming from
high-wage establishments did not increase at treated establishments, suggesting they did
not become more attractive for workers. Second, the effect of the SMW introduction on
minimum hire quality is concentrated in those establishments that report more pre-hire
screening in the pre-reform period, i.e., where it is more feasible for employers to distinguish
worker quality before hiring.
The main contribution of this paper is providing some of the first causal evidence that a
minimum wage raises employers’ hiring standards. This is consistent with the conclusion of
the only other causal study on the question, written contemporaneously and independently
(Clemens et al., 2018), though my paper emphasizes hiring standards with respect to un-
observed productivity. Some disagreement remains between our studies whether increased
hiring standards also materialize in new hires’ observed characteristics such as age and ed-
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ucation; like the majority of papers looking at such labor-labor substitution, I do not find
evidence for substitution toward older or more highly educated workers. The most likely
explanation for this is that these observed characteristics do not sufficiently differentiate
between the productivity of the relevant low-wage workers.
A potential implication of my findings for policy-makers is that even without negative
aggregate employment effects there may be some losers from the introduction of a mini-
mum wage—namely those who are deemed too unproductive to be hired at the new wage
floor. Such unemployed workers may benefit more from productivity-enhancing interven-
tions than from measures aimed at improving the matching process (such as application
training). Another implication pointed out by Fairris and Bujanda (2008) is that the
wage-boosting effect of the minimum wage for low earners may be “dissipated” by in-
creased hiring standards: the more productive the workers who are hired at or just above
the new minimum wage, the higher their earnings potential would have been elsewhere,
too. This would dampen the redistributive power of the minimum wage.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.7.1 Proofs of theoretical claims
Ad Equation (1.1):
E[Π|z] = E[a− w|z]
= E[a|z]− w
= E[a] +
Cov[a, z]
Var[z]
(z − E[z])− w
= E[a] +
Cov[a, a+ ]
Var[a+ ]
(z − E[a+ ])− w
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σ2a + σ
2

(z −ma)− w.
Ad Equation (1.2):
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Ad Equation (1.3):
dt
dw
=
d
dw
1
σ2a
[(σ2a + σ
2
 )w − σ2ma]
=
σ2a + σ
2

σ2a
> 0.
1.7.2 Stable treatment unit value assumption
In addition to the parallel-trends assumption discussed in Section 1.4.1, identifying a causal
effect in a DiD setting requires the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) to
hold. SUTVA maintains that units do not interfere with each other. More specifically,
SUTVA says that one unit receiving the treatment must not influence the outcome of
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another establishment (particularly a control group one). Here I provide some indicative
correlation evidence for the validity of SUTVA in Section 1.6.1.
In my setting, SUTVA would be violated if, by hiring more selectively, establishments
treated by the minimum wage “poached” productive workers that would else have been
hired by establishments untreated by the minimum wage. Such a hire stealing effect may
reduce minimum hire quality at control group establishments, causing me to overestimate
the effect of the minimum wage on employers’ worker selection.
To address this threat I identify circumstances where hire stealing effects are more and
less likely and test whether heterogeneity in the effect of the minimum wage is consistent
with the SUTVA violation. That a treated establishment’s recruitment directly affects
untreated establishments by depriving them of a good potential hire is more likely in
tight labor markets where there are many vacancies for each unemployed worker, causing
employers to compete for hires. If the hire stealing effect biased my findings, the effect of
the minimum wage on worker selection would be less pronounced in slack labor markets -
where one establishment’s hiring has little effect on other establishments’ choices from the
pool of unemployed - than in tight labor markets.
Table 1.7 looks at effect heterogeneity by labor market tightness, considering variation
in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio across German federal states. Column (1) esti-
mates Equation (1.4) for establishments in states where the average pre-reform vacancy-
to-unemployment ratio is smaller than the median, i.e., for slacker labor markets. Column
(2) does the same for establishments in tighter labor markets. The estimated minimum
wage effect is bigger in slack labor markets. This is contrary to the prediction of the
SUTVA violation considered. One may interpret this as a piece of suggestive evidence that
the hire-stealing effect is unlikely to perceptibly bias my findings. It is important to re-
member, however, that this comparison is far from ceteris-paribus: German federal states
with different vacancy-to-unemployment ratios are likely to vary in many unobserved di-
mensions that may also influence the effect of the minimum wage on firms’ worker selection.
Moreover, German federal states do not coincide with local or regional labor markets.
While I cannot present a conclusive empirical test to rule out the hire-stealing effect
the latter appears theoretically unlikely. It is not plausible in practice that employers
formerly paying below the minimum wage would suddenly, by paying the minimum wage,
lure workers who would otherwise have ended up in higher-wage establishments in any
systematic way.
1.7.3 Robustness checks and additional results
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Table 1.7: Effect on hire quality by state labor market tightness
(1) (2)
Slack labor markets Tight labor markets
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 0.2484*** 0.1332**
(0.0729) (0.0663)
Observations 3,624 3,967
Establishments 764 731
Adjusted R2 0.0110 0.0210
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. The dependent
variable is minimum hire quality, with CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated 2002-2009 used as a hire
quality measure. (1) reports the estimated effect of the minimum wage introduction on establishments in federal
states (La¨nder) with below-median average pre-reform labor market tightness (V/U ratio); (2) does the same for
establishments in federal states with a vacancy-unemployment ratio above the median. DiD estimates are from
establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to
rule out anticipation effects.
Table 1.8: Minimum wage effect on hire quality: MW bite measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D treat post=1 0.1888*** 0.0986** 0.1040**
(0.0496) (0.0497) (0.0415)
MW post 0.2743**
(0.1183)
Observations 7,591 7,591 7,579 7,489
Establishments 1,491 1,491 1,489 1,444
Adjusted R2 0.0150 0.0134 0.0130 0.0140
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
is minimum hire quality, where hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated 2002-
2009. In (1) and (2) minimum wage exposure (MW) is computed based on full-time workers’ wages. In (3) MW is
calculated using additional data on hours worked. In (4) MW is measured only on 1 July 2013 (rather than averaged
over the pre-reform period). DiD estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates
other than year dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
Table 1.9: Minimum wage effect on hire quality: aggregation methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minimum P10 P25 P50
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 0.1888*** 0.1604*** 0.0730 0.0595
(0.0496) (0.0584) (0.0557) (0.0550)
Observations 7,591 7,591 7,591 7,591
Establishments 1,491 1,491 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0150 0.0040 0.0029 0.0018
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
varies according to the establishment-level aggregation of individual hire quality: minimum (1), first decile (2), first
quartile (3) and median (4). Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated 2002-2009.
(Continuous) DiD estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year
dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
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Figure 1.6: Minimum wage effect on minimum hire quality (log employment weighting)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum hire
quality. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies
and with log(employment) weights. Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated
2002-2009. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Figure 1.7: Minimum wage effect on minimum hire quality (preliminary CHK update)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum hire
quality. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies.
Hire quality is measured by a preliminary update of CHK’s individual AKM worker effects. These are estimated
2003-2010 (hence the shortened period of analysis) and include workers from both West and East Germany. Vertical
bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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Figure 1.8: 2012 screening intensity distribution
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Note: This figure shows a histogram for screening intensity (in hours) for an average successful applicant in 2012.
The screening intensity measure is from a survey of HR executives (LPP, 2012).
Figure 1.9: Minimum wage effect by screening feasibility
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Note: This figure shows DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum hire quality.
Estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year dummies. The year
2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects. Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects
estimated 2002-2009. Screening feasibility is measured by establishments’ self-reported pre-reform screening intensity
(LPP 2012). Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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Table 1.10: Minimum wage effect on observable hire quality
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployed Low-skill Age
Continuous DiD estimate (Bite*Post) 0.0042 0.0019 0.7845
(0.0197) (0.0176) (0.6754)
Observations 8,473 8,473 8,473
Establishments 1,491 1,491 1,491
Adjusted R2 0.0098 0.0401 0.0113
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Dependent variable
is (1) the share among new hires of formerly unemployed workers; (2) the share of new hires that have neither a
vocational qualification nor a secondary school diploma that qualifies them for university entry (Abitur); (3) new
hires’ mean age. DiD estimates are from establishment fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year
dummies. The year 2014 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
Table 1.11: Relationship between AKM worker effects and observed worker ability
(1) (2)
Wage < SMW Wage ≥ SMW
(1) (2)
Establishment entry from UE dummy 0.0579*** -0.0592***
(0.0046) (0.0030)
Less than Abitur or equiv, no voc quali -0.0649*** -0.2295***
(0.0048) (0.0039)
Constant 3.4779*** 3.8197***
(0.0034) (0.0015)
AKM person effect SD .2912 .3702
Observations 16025 79081
Adjusted R2 0.0189 0.0261
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Coefficients are from a
cross-sectional OLS regression of AKM worker effects on observed worker characteristics. The table compares two
groups of new hires in the pre-reform period (2010-13): Column (1) reports results for the sub-sample of workers
with starting wages below the minimum wage and (2) focuses on the workers with starting wages at or above the
minimum wage.
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Figure 1.10: Minimum wage effect on new hires’ AKM coverage
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the share of
new hires for whom an AKM worker effect estimate from CHK is available. Estimates are from an establishment
fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Figure 1.11: Minimum wage effect on women’s hire share
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the female share
of new hires. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year
dummies. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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Figure 1.12: Minimum wage effect on new hires’ average age
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on new hires’ mean
age. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Figure 1.13: Minimum wage effect on the number of hires
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the number of
hires. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies.
Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
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Figure 1.14: Minimum wage effect on maximum hire quality
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on maximum hire
quality. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies.
Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM worker effects estimated 2002-2009. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Figure 1.15: Minimum wage effect on establishment attractiveness
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the share of
hires coming directly from high-wage establishments. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-effects specification
without covariates other than year dummies. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the establishment level.
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Figure 1.16: Minimum wage effect heterogeneity by screening feasibility
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the minimum wage introduction on minimum hire
quality separately for below- and above-median screening feasibility. Estimates are from an establishment fixed-
effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Hire quality is measured by CHK’s individual AKM
worker effects estimated 2002-2009. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at
the establishment level.
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Chapter 2
The effect of employment protection on firms’
worker selection
Authors: Sebastian Butschek and Jan Sauermann
Abstract: To estimate the causal effect of employment protection on firms’ worker
selection, we study a 2001 policy change in Sweden that reduced dismissal costs for
firms with less than ten employees. These small firms employ over a tenth of Sweden’s
workforce. Our difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ hiring uses individual ability
measures including estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores from the
military draft. Comparing treated small firms to slightly larger, untreated ones we find
that the reform reduced minimum hire quality by five per cent of a standard deviation,
half of which we can attribute to firms’ hiring becoming less selective. Consistent with
this, we show that employers’ reliance on network-based hiring also goes down as firms
react to the reduction of dismissal costs. Our results help discriminate between existing
theories, supporting the prediction that firms shift their hiring standards in response to
changes in dismissal costs.
Keywords: worker selection, screening, hiring standard, employment protection, dismissal
costs.
JEL Codes: M51, D22, J24, J38.
2.1 Introduction
Economists have long studied the effect of labor market regulation on how many workers
are hired. Far less is known about whether regulation also affects who gets a job. Does
labor market policy influence firms’ worker selection? This question has consequences
for the efficiency of labor market outcomes, as firms’ selectiveness directly influences the
allocation of workers. Moreover, the question has distributional implications: changes in
firms’ worker selection will alter the employment prospects of the most disadvantaged labor
market participants, such as the long-term unemployed. Firms’ worker selection may thus
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be an overlooked pathway from labor market regulation to labor productivity and to the
employment dynamics of vulnerable workers.
Several theoretical papers on the hiring process agree that there should be an effect of
labor market regulation on the selectiveness of firms’ hiring. The existing models suggest
different mechanisms for the link from regulation to firms’ worker selection though. For
example, the model in Lazear (1995) implies that tighter regulation makes hiring more
selective as firms hire less “risky” workers, i.e., firms reduce the spread of their hires’
ability distribution. By contrast, the matching model in Pries and Rogerson (2005) predicts
that stricter regulation increases firm selectiveness by causing employers to no longer hire
“bad” workers, i.e., to raise their hiring standard. Do firms reduce the variance of hires’
ability at the bottom and the top or do firms primarily avoid the bottom tail of the ability
distribution? These are, roughly, the testable predictions of the risky-hires framework
formulated by Lazear (1995) and the matching model variant in Pries and Rogerson (2005).
Empirically studying the effect of regulation on firms’ selectiveness offers the prospect
of enhancing our understanding of the hiring process by discriminating between these
suggested mechanisms.
In this paper, we investigate if and how a relaxation of employment protection leg-
islation (EPL) reduces firms’ selectivity in hiring. To estimate the effect of weaker EPL
on firms’ worker selection we exploit a Swedish reform that made it easier for small firms
to lay off workers. The policy change generated exogenous variation in dismissal costs
across firms and over time, whose effects we analyze in a difference-in-differences (DiD)
framework. Administrative data on the universe of Swedish workers and firms allow us to
precisely measure firms’ affectedness by the reform and to credibly proxy for the ability of
new hires. We find that the reduction in dismissal costs directly reduces firms’ selective-
ness by about 2.5% of a standard deviation. We further conclude that this is driven by an
adjustment of hiring thresholds rather than by making riskier hires.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that employment protection legislation
directly affects whom firms hire, and that this results from firms lowering their hiring
threshold. Regarding the first point, we confirm and extend the findings of two other
papers that provide evidence consistent with EPL affecting worker selection (Marinescu,
2009; Bjuggren and Skedinger, 2018). In this study we go further by establishing a causal
effect on the ability of new hires and by providing direct evidence for a change in screening
intensity. With respect to the second point, no evidence exists on how dismissal costs affect
the selectiveness of firms’ hiring. This paper is the first to study potential mechanisms
underlying the link between EPL and firms’ worker selection, enabling us to discriminate
between the theoretical predictions of Lazear (1995) and Pries and Rogerson (2005).
Our first step in investigating whether EPL changes worker selection is to estimate
the overall effect of Sweden’s 2001 EPL reform on firms’ minimum hire quality, i.e., the
ability of the least productive hire a firm makes in a year. As we discuss below, this overall
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effect may contain indirect effects other than changes in firms’ selectiveness. Our preferred
proxy for worker productivity is an estimated worker effect (AKM) from two-way-fixed
effect log-wage regressions in the spirit of Abowd et al. (1999). Using a DiD specification
that exploits the size cut-off in firms’ eligibility for the EPL reduction, we estimate that the
reform reduced firms’ minimum hire quality by 5% of a standard deviation. Our alternative
ability measures are military draft test scores for cognitive and psychological aptitude from
age 18 and grade point averages (GPAs) from age 15. We prefer AKMs as the alternatives
cover either only men or only young people. Nonetheless, the alternative ability proxies
produce remarkably similar effect estimates.
We then isolate the direct effect of Sweden’s EPL reform on firms’ worker selection.
To do so we quantify the role of a mechanism that may lower firms’ minimum hire quality
but does not go through the selectiveness of firms’ hiring: as reduced dismissal costs
make firms hire more workers, they may—by chance—employ lower-ability workers without
actively adjusting their selectiveness.1 We estimate the importance of this “number-of-
hires” channel by simulating a counter-factual scenario designed to preclude changes in
firm selectiveness. Our findings suggest the number-of-hires channel accounts for about
half of the overall effect of the EPL reform on firms’ minimum hire quality. This leads to
our estimated direct effect of Sweden’s EPL reform on firms’ selectiveness of about 2.5%
of a standard deviation.
Having established that lower dismissal costs reduce firms’ selectiveness we proceed
to investigate two mechanisms suggested by the theoretical literature. The first potential
channel is based on the insight that firms may like hiring risky workers as long as workers
are easy to fire: these hires provide option value as they may turn out more productive
than expected (Lazear, 1995). If dismissal costs go down, firms should then intensify their
hiring of risky workers. In terms of unobserved ability, the variance of new hires’ ability
distribution will go up as the firm now hires workers that will either turn out less able
than earlier cohorts or prove to be more productive than expected. In our setting, this
would imply that lower EPL both reduces minimum hire quality and increases maximum
hire quality: under reduced dismissal costs, hires should be better than expected as often
as they are worse than expected. Adjusting for the number-of-hires channel, we find
no evidence that firms symmetrically increase the riskiness of their hiring. That is, our
evidence does not support the mechanism suggested by the risky-hires framework in Lazear
(1995).
The second suggested mechanism for the link between EPL and worker selection works
through firms’ hiring standards. The idea is that there is a productivity threshold below
which a firm does not hire applicants. In their matching model with employer search,
1Pries and Rogerson (2005) predict a direct effect of EPL on both firms’ hiring threshold and on worker
turnover. There is also empirical evidence on an effect of EPL on hiring rates both internationally and in
Sweden (Kugler and Pica, 2008; von Below and Skogman Thoursie, 2010).
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Pries and Rogerson (2005) show that dismissal costs shift this threshold, implying that
a reduction in EPL should shift firms’ hiring standards downward. For our setting this
results in the prediction that the EPL relaxation should lower firms’ minimum hire quality
without increasing maximum hire quality. Consistent with this prediction, we find that
the reform reduced firms’ selectiveness only at the bottom of the hire ability distribution.
An additional implication of firms lowering their hiring threshold in response to the EPL
reform is that employers may relax their pre-hire screening of applicants. To obtain a direct
measure of such screening, we build on the finding in Hensvik and Skans (2016) that firms
use incumbent workers’ networks of past co-workers to hire selectively. Using the number
of co-worker links from new hires to incumbents as a proxy, we find that reduced EPL
causes firms to rely less on such referral-based hiring. Both pieces of evidence suggest that
firms’ worker selection responded to the EPL relaxation by becoming less stringent with
respect to low ability. This favors the hiring threshold mechanism of Pries and Rogerson
(2005) as an explanation of the effect of dismissal costs on firms’ worker selection.
Our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the mechanisms driving the
effect of EPL on firms’ worker selection. In showing that there is a link between EPL
and firms’ selectiveness it extends scarce existing evidence. Three studies present evidence
consistent with regulation affecting firms’ worker selection. Marinescu (2009) studies the
effect of an increase of EPL in the UK on job durations. Her main result is that shortening
the qualification period for claiming unfair dismissal decreases the hazard of termination
not only for directly affected workers, but also for unaffected workers hired after the policy
change. Although her data do not allow her to provide direct evidence on the quality of
hires, she shows that the pattern is consistent with EPL inducing more selective hiring. We
confirm and complement her suggested explanations by making use of explicit information
on worker ability.2
In a recent working paper written independently from and contemporaneously to ours,
Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018) analyze the effect of the same 2001 EPL reform on the share
of workers firms hire from unemployment and from active labor market programs. They
find that the EPL reduction increases the share hired from these sources and argue that
this is consistent with firms reducing their screening. Their paper and ours arrive at similar
conclusions using different pieces of evidence: their argument is that unemployed workers
are harder to screen, so that intensified hiring of unemployed workers is an indication
that firms are happy to screen less. Our argument goes through hire ability and through
firms’ network-based hiring, both of which point to a relaxation of screening. The findings
2The finding in Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) that stronger EPL decreases the chances of unemployed
individuals is also similar to our conclusion. In their setting with adverse selection, unemployed workers are
more negatively selected than employed workers because firms first lay off the lemons. When firing costs
increase, firms rely on statistical discrimination to avoid unproductive hires—they shy away from hiring
unemployed job-seekers. In our setting, by contrast, firms screen and directly identify less productive
workers before hiring them.
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of Bjuggren and Skedinger (2018) and ours strengthen each other: they bring different
evidence to bear on the question whether EPL affects firms’ worker selection and come to
consistent and complementary answers.
Also relevant to our study are the findings of von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010)
and Bjuggren (2018), who study the effects of the EPL reduction on labour turnover and
firm productivity, respectively. At first glance our finding that the 2001 EPL reform made
firms’ hiring less selective seems at odds with Bjuggren (2018), who finds positive effects of
the same EPL relaxation on labor productivity. Looking at the theoretical motivation of
his analysis, however, suggests that there does not need to be a contradiction: in standard
models of reduced employment protection, it is not a change in who is hired in the first place
that improves the allocation of labor, but increased labor market churning (Hopenhayn and
Rogerson, 1993). Indeed, the reform has been shown to have increased both firms’ hiring
and their firing without a change in net employment (von Below and Skogman Thoursie,
2010). We show that the reform increased the dispersion of hire quality. It is possible that
firms increased worker productivity by first hiring less selectively but then identifying and
retaining the abler workers. This would be consistent with both higher churn and a larger
ability range of workers entering.
By studying the effects of dismissal costs on worker-firm matching, this paper also
expands the scope of the literature studying the effects of Sweden’s 2001 EPL reform.
Labor market outcomes considered by existing papers include sickness absence (Lindbeck
et al., 2006; Olsson, 2009) and parental leave take-up (Olsson, 2017).3
At a more general level, this study contributes to the literature looking at determinants
of selectivity in worker-firm matching. Examples include the analysis of foreign ownership
and hiring selectivity (Balsvik and Haller, 2015), the relation between management quality
and the quality of worker flows in and out of the establishment (Bender et al., 2018), the
role of networks in hiring (Hensvik and Skans, 2016), and skill sorting across firms over time
(H˚akanson et al., 2015). By analyzing the effect of dismissal costs on worker selection, our
paper not only looks at a very different determinant of worker-firm matching than these
studies, but it also offers exogenous variation in the determinant of interest, allowing us to
identify a causal relationship.
To support the causal interpretation of our results, we present evidence addressing
a number of threats to causal identification. These include concurrent changes in labor
market legislation, workers’ differential self-selection into firms, non-classical measurement
error in worker ability, selective attrition and time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Our results
are robust to a broad range of tests.
3As there is practically no evidence on the effects of EPL on worker-firm matching internationally,
our paper generally broadens the literature on the effects of employment protection legislation—see, e.g.,
Bastgen and Holzner (2017) for a recent review.
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2.2 Institutional background
The 2001 reform of Sweden’s employment protection provisions created variation in firms’
recruitment incentives that we want to exploit. In this section we briefly describe the
institutional setting of our quasi-experiment before discussing selected features of Swedish
EPL and its 2001 reform that are relevant to our analysis.4
2.2.1 Employment protection legislation in Sweden
Swedish EPL is relatively strict: dismissals are only allowed in case of misconduct and
redundancy. In the latter case, i.e., when a firm’s business is underperforming and it wants
to lay off a worker, legislation from 1974 further dictates whom it may fire. A last-in-first-
out (LIFO) rule stipulates that the establishment’s most recent hire has to be dismissed
first. The LIFO rule constrains firms’ ability to lay off its least productive workers in a
downturn, instead forcing them to dismiss those with the lowest seniority (SFS, 1982).
The 2001 reform of Sweden’s EPL did not change the basic idea of protecting higher-
tenure workers but allowed small firms to exempt up to two of its workers from the LIFO
rule. This meant that out of their three most recent hires, firms with ten or fewer workers
became able to choose whom to lay off.5 The degree to which this relaxed employment
protection varies by firm size (see below for details).
Given that small firms (with up to ten workers) make up a sizeable share of the work-
force (11.2% in 1999), these changes constitute a substantial liberalization of labor market
regulation. Notwithstanding its importance the 2001 EPL reform came about quickly and
rather unexpectedly: two possible versions of it were proposed in February 2000 and the
second, after some modification, was written into law in October 2000 to become effective
on 1 January 2001. That the reform was unexpected is best illustrated by who originated it:
an atypical coalition of opposition parties (Liberal-Conservatives and Greens) pressed the
unwilling minority government to make a proposal, which the governing Social Democrats
sought to derail even after presenting it (Lindbeck et al., 2006).
Most changes to labor market regulation in the 1990s did not coincide with the EPL
reform in either timing or targeting. One was a temporary provision allowing all firms to
exempt two workers from the LIFO tenure ranking, effective only during 1994 (SFS, 1993;
Skedinger, 2008). Second, there was a 1997 reform that made it easier to hire workers
under fixed-term contracts without a particular reason, though for at most 5 individuals
and with individual employment on a temporary contract capped at 12 months in a three-
4See Lindbeck et al. (2006), von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) and Bjuggren (2018) for other
information on the 2001 EPL reform. Skedinger (2008) and Bo¨ckerman et al. (2018) contain useful infor-
mation on EPL legislation in Sweden generally.
5One implication is that on-the-job screening may have been made more feasible by the reform: in
addition to the probation period affected firms now had time to fire a recent hire as long as there were no
more than two more recent hires.
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years period (Sjo¨berg, 2009; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). Unlike the LIFO reform of 2001
these policy changes applied to firms of all sizes equally. They also were not introduced at
the same time as the change in EPL. The only exception is an amendment to the Gender
Equality Act, which we discuss in detail in Section 2.6.
2.2.2 Institutional detail of the last-in-first-out rule
The change in EPL applied to small firms of all sectors except private households with
employed persons, as the LIFO rules do not apply to these (SFS, 1982). Defining “small”,
the reform law makes it clear that the threshold of ten workers is in heads (not full-
time equivalents) and includes both part-time and full-time workers as well as those on
permanent and temporary contracts (von Below and Skogman Thoursie, 2010). The head
count, however, excludes owners and their family members, (leading) managers and workers
on employment subsidies (SFS, 1982). What the law is less explicit on is the time frame
during which LIFO-relevant firm size is measured (more in Section 2.3.3).
The policy change did not alter the fact that firms (both small and large) had to
define a tenure ranking of eligible workers in case of dismissals.6 What did change was
the proportion of workers in the tenure ranking who enjoyed LIFO protection: before the
reform, a downsizing firm had to lay off the person at the bottom of the relevant tenure
ranking. After the reform, the firm was able to choose between the bottom three workers.
As a consequence, the bite of the 2001 EPL reform was largest for the smallest firms. For
firms with 2 or 3 workers, employment protection was practically abolished. For firms
with 4-10 workers, the share of protected workers fell by between 67% and 22%. For larger
firms, EPL did not change (cf. Table 2.1).
Finally, there is a degree of fuzziness to the reform. Some firms too large to be eligible
will, through other means, have managed to relax or avoid LIFO’s strict rules. For example,
Bo¨ckerman et al. (2018) point out that LIFO-relevant tenure rankings are defined separately
for each establishment, blue-collar and white-collar workers and may even be split up again
by worker skill.7 Conversely, a certain fraction of eligible firms will have retained their
previous EPL provisions, as employers and trade unions may negotiate modifications to
the LIFO rules in local agreements. Nonetheless, the evidence on the LIFO reform’s effects
suggests that the EPL provisions from 1974 are a binding constraint on firms’ decisions
(e.g., von Below and Skogman Thoursie, 2010; Bjuggren, 2018).
6Both before and after the reform, the protection afforded by the LIFO rule did not cover workers on
temporary contracts (even though these workers entered in the head count determining whether the firm
was affected by the reform).
7To avoid confusion, we reiterate the role of the firm and the establishment in Swedish EPL: it is firm
size that determines whether or not an employer is eligible for the relaxation of EPL effected by the 2001
reform. The establishment is only relevant for determining the LIFO ranking, which must be respected in
laying off individual workers. As will become clear below this implies that for us the firm is the relevant
unit of analysis.
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Table 2.1: Degree of EPL before and after the 2001 reform, by firm size
# workers Pre-reform Post-reform ∆ protected
Protected Unprotected Protected Unprotected
2 1 1 0 2 -100%
3 2 1 0 3 -100%
4 3 1 1 3 -67%
5 4 1 2 3 -50%
6 5 1 3 3 -40%
7 6 1 4 3 -34%
8 7 1 5 3 -29%
9 8 1 6 3 -25%
10 9 1 7 3 -22%
11+ 10+ 1 10+ 1 0%
Note: Calculated levels and changes in EPL ignore exemptions, such as workers on fixed-term contracts.
2.3 Data and method
2.3.1 Data
To be able to analyze firms’ hiring behavior, we need to characterize firms’ new hires. For
this we would like to capture the timing and nature of all inflows (not just the change
in net employment between a given day one year and the same day the next year). To
do so we use individual-level data at monthly frequency on the universe of workers from
Statistics Sweden (SCB). We extract and infer information about when workers enter new
firms and about worker characteristics, most importantly their ability. We also use the
firm identifiers in the individual-level data to infer the existence and size of firms at any
point in time. We then combine this information to obtain a yearly firm-level panel that
tracks all Swedish firms of a certain size over time and characterizes their worker inflows.
Data sources We construct information on worker flows from Jobbregistret (JOBB), a
register containing the universe of individual employment spells in Sweden from 1986 on-
wards. The spell data allow us to both identify new hires and measure firm size at monthly
resolution.8 In addition, we use JOBB to obtain information on firms’ industry, ownership
(private/public), location and age. Finally, JOBB is our main source of information on
individuals’ labor market history, including where and with whom they worked and how
much they earned. We use this information to estimate individual ability (see Section 2.3.5
for detail on our estimation of AKM worker effects) as well as co-worker links (see Section
2.5.3). Drawing on other registers, we obtain further individual characteristics, such as
workers’ gender, age, highest education and GPA from grade 9. For a majority of male
8LISA, a multi-purpose register containing similar information, would only have given us individuals’
employment in November of each year.
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hires we can also match military draft test scores to our sample. Table 2.9 in the appendix
provides more detail on variables and data sources used in this study.
Time period Our period of analysis is 1993-2004. This gives us seven years (1993-1999)
before the EPL reform we use was discussed and could have been anticipated (in 2000). We
then have four years (2001-2004) during which we can study the short- and medium-run
effects of the change in EPL. We do not extend our window of observation further into the
past than 1993 as we use the period from 1986-1992 to estimate individual ability (further
detail in Section 2.3.5).
Sample restrictions In our main analyses we focus on small firms employing between
two and 15 workers in 1999. To ensure we have the relevant firm size measure for all, we
restrict our sample to firms that existed in 1999. There are 275,731 firms in 1999 and we
keep the 129,187 firms that were between two and 15 in size that year (see Section 2.3.2).9
We then remove the 1 private household with employed persons, as LIFO rules do not
apply to such “firms”. Finally, we drop extreme outliers in terms of employment growth,
i.e., the 0.5% of firms that experienced the largest inflows of workers.10
2.3.2 Identification strategy
We want to estimate the effect of a change in EPL on the selectiveness of firms’ hiring.
The 2001 reform made EPL less strict for small firms. Because until 1999 this policy
change was unexpected, we view it as exogenous variation in EPL over time for small firms
(our treated group). The empirical strategy we employ addresses two key requirements for
identifying a causal effect: first, we find a control group of similar but unaffected firms to
obtain an estimate of the counter-factual hiring behavior of the treated firms in absence
of the reform. Second, we recognize that, from 2000 onwards, well-managed firms may
have downsized strategically to benefit from the reform. To ensure that such selection is
not captured by our effect estimates we assign firms to the treated and control groups
before the reform and keep them in that group. For assignment we use the latest possible
time pre-reform when we can be reasonably sure that firms could not have anticipated the
reform. As Section 2.2 illustrates, such anticipation cannot be ruled out in 2000 but is
highly unlikely in 1999. We therefore use 1999 firm size to assign firms to the treated or
control groups.
9Note that firm size may be below two or above 15 before or after 1999.
10We show in Table 2.10 in the appendix that this restriction does not drive our results.
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More formally, to estimate the effect of the 2001 relaxation of Sweden’s LIFO rule on
small firms’ hiring standards, we use the following difference-in-differences (DiD) specifi-
cation:
yjt = α+ βTRj ∗ POSTt + γt + δTRj + jt, (2.1)
where firm j is defined as treated (TRj = 1) if it has 10 or fewer employees in 1999.
Firms with 11 to 15 workers are used as the control group. Observations between 2001
and 2004 make up the post-reform period, POSTt = 1. Observations from 1993 through
1999 are defined as the pre-reform period. The year 2000, when anticipation behavior is
plausible but the reform was not yet in effect, is dropped from this DiD specification. γt are
year fixed effects. Our main estimates do not include control variables or firm fixed effects,
though we show that controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity leaves results qualitatively
unchanged.11 We cluster standard errors at the firm level. The outcome yjt is a measure
for firms’ selectiveness in hiring. In our main analyses, it is the minimum ability of firm
j’s hires in year t (more detail in Section 2.3.4).
The DiD estimate of the reform’s effect on hiring standards is given by βˆ. As we use
a pre-determined and time-invariant measure of firm size, our DiD specification yields an
intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate of β. This has the benefit of immunity to endogenous se-
lection of firms into treatment: firms remain classified as control (treated) if they employed
up to (more than) ten workers in 1999, even if they strategically downsize (naively expand).
A potential drawback of the ITT approach is that it may bias our estimates toward zero
to the extent that firms non-selectively shrink into or grow out of the treatment group.
Our key identifying assumption is E [jt|TRj ∗ POSTt] = 0: absent the EPL reform,
treated firms’ worker selection would have followed a trend parallel to that of control firms’.
While it is impossible to test this assumption for the reform years, we can check the extent
to which it holds in the pre-reform period. To do so, we consider an event-study framework
of the following form:
yjt = α+
∑
t
(βtTRj ∗ γt) + γt + δTRj + jt, (2.2)
where the DiD coefficient βt is year-specific and 1999 is used as the reference year. Parallel
trends in the outcome variable during the pre-reform period would imply estimates of
βt that are indistinguishable from zero for the years 1993-1998. Non-zero βˆt=2000 would
constitute evidence for anticipation effects. The yearly effect estimates for the years 2001-
2004 make it possible to learn whether the reform’s effects, if any, are sustained in the
medium run or die out over time.
11Not including fixed effects allows us to look at effect heterogeneity by firm size, which is time invariant
in our empirical approach.
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There are potential threats to our identifying assumption that are not addressed by
comparing pre-reform trends. Our identifying assumption would be violated if trends in
outcomes, while parallel in the pre-reform period, would have deviated from their parallel
paths in the post-reform period even in the absence of the EPL reform. We return to this
issue in Section 2.6.7.
2.3.3 EPL reform bite measure
We want to compare firms potentially affected by the EPL reform to unaffected firms.
This makes 1999 firm size a central measure. A key issue in defining firm size is whom to
include in the headcount that determines whether the firm is small enough to benefit from
the LIFO relaxation. As described in Section 2.2, owners/managers are excluded from this
headcount. We follow Bjuggren (2018) in arguing that each firm will have at least one
owner/manager and subtract one from the raw headcount.12
There is another important issue in defining firm size: is LIFO-relevant firm size the
average number of employees in a year or the snapshot headcount at the time the firm
wants to lay off a worker? Here the law makes provides no explicit information. We argue
that this ambiguity is relatively unproblematic because we are most interested in how the
expected ease of firing affects firms’ hiring. When forming expectations about what rules
apply to them in present and future, firms, like us, will need to rely on some approximation
of their headcount. We choose the average number of employees in a year as a simple proxy
that also takes account of seasonal fluctuations. That is, we use the employment spell data
to determine firms’ monthly number of individuals in dependent employment and take the
average for each year. We then round this average to the nearest integer.
2.3.4 Measuring the selectiveness of firms’ hiring
As a proxy for the selectiveness of firms’ hiring we use their minimum hire quality in a given
year, minj,t{abilityi}. This allows us to capture changes in firms’ worker selection driven
by both the risky-hiring mechanism (Lazear, 1995), which predicts a change in hire quality
spread, and the hiring-threshold channel (Pries and Rogerson, 2005), which hypothesizes
a shifting of hiring standards at the bottom. Measuring firms’ time-varying minimum hire
quality requires individual-level ability proxies.
12In principle, the data allow us to account for most qualifications detailed in Section 2.2: they identify
owners/entrepreneurs and we can use family linkages to find out whether their parents, siblings or children
also work at the firm. However, because in 85.4% of all firm-level observations for 1999, none of the
individuals linked to a firm is categorized as either owner or manager, we ignore this partial information.
Von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) choose a different approach, excluding owners/managers from the
count where such information is available and reducing the head count by one where no manager/owner
appears in the employment spell data under that firm ID. We prefer the Bjuggren (2018) approach because
it requires fewer assumptions. Table 2.11 in the appendix shows that our main results are robust to the
firm size definition suggested by von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010).
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Worker ability measures Thanks to the wealth of Swedish register data there are three
main options for measuring worker ability: first, average school grades at age 15 (GPA);
second, military draft test scores at age 18 for cognitive ability (COG) and psychological
aptitude (NON-COG) (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011); and third, estimated worker fixed
effects (AKM) from a two-way fixed-effects log wage regression with person and firm effects
(Abowd et al., 1999). GPA is dominated by the other two measures: it is available only for
some of the young birth cohorts in our data (born between 1973 and 1982).13 While draft
test scores are arguably more precise measures of individual ability than AKM estimates,
the former were collected only for men. AKM, on the other hand, will capture individual
ability only to the extent that it is reflected in people’s gross monthly earnings. Some of
Sweden’s elaborate wage-setting institutions will no doubt cause individual wages to depart
from a worker’s marginal product of labor. Nonetheless, AKMs will contain information
about those aspects of time-constant individual productivity that are remunerated in the
labor market. The key advantage of AKMs is that they can be obtained for both men and
women. For this reason we use AKMs as our main ability measure and rely on draft test
scores and GPA to explore the robustness of our results.14
2.3.5 Estimating AKM worker effects
To estimate time-invariant individual productivity we use individual-level spell data on
employment from JOBB. We obtain full time-equivalent (FTE) monthly wages from the
Wage Survey Statistics (WSS). For the AKM estimation we use data on the period from
1986 (the beginning of records) through 1992 (the year before the beginning of our analysis
period). We want our ability estimates to be pre-determined from the point of view of our
analysis and so avoid an overlap with our analysis period.
In our AKM estimation we include individuals aged 18-65 with a November spell for
whom we have some FTE wage data.15 We deflate wages using the CPI and winsorize at
0.5% and 99.5% of the annual real monthly FTE wage distribution. Information on years
of schooling/education is available only from 1990; for earlier years, we impute it from the
first year it is available.16
13AKM estimates are available for birth cohorts 1922-1976 and draft test scores males born 1951 -1991.
14Butschek and Sauermann (2019b) compare different individual ability measures and find a correlation
between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores of around 29% and GPAs at age 15 and
cognitive test scores of around 63%.
15We have a measure of FTE monthly wages for 45.4% of person-year observations, or at least one monthly
FTE wage observation for 63.7% of individuals. Coverage is partial because WSS is a survey-based register
that only covers a stratified random sample of smaller firms.
16We do not have reliable information on whether individuals are primarily studying. We therefore omit
this information.
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Following Abowd et al. (1999) and Card et al. (2013) we estimate a two-way fixed-effects
regression:
ln (wijt) = αi + ψj + γt + x
′
itβ + rijt, (2.3)
where ln (wijt) is the natural logarithm of individual i’s hourly wage at firm j in year t.
Moreover, there are additive fixed effects for individuals (αi) and firms (ψj) as well as a set
of year dummies (γt) and a vector of time-varying individual-level controls (xit). Controls
include age squared and age cubed as well as education categories interacted with the year
dummies, age squared and age cubed.17 We deviate from Card et al. (2013) by estimating
the two-way fixed-effects regression for men and women together so αˆi is comparable across
gender. We obtain individual fixed-effect estimates αˆi for 78.7% of the workers for whom
we observe a monthly FTE wage and estimates of ψj for the 46.6% of firms that have
multiple workers and are connected by worker mobility.18
2.3.6 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for our main estimation sample, separately for
treated and control firms. Panel A summarizes continuous variables. The average treat-
ment group firm employs 4.9 workers, compared to 12.7 workers for the average control
group firm. Treated firms have existed for a bit shorter, employ older workers and slightly
more women and they pay a little less. Means are virtually identical across groups for
workers’ years of schooling and estimated AKM person and firm fixed effects. Panel B
shows means for dummy variables. These are very similar across groups, with two excep-
tions: treated firms are less likely to be manufacturing firms and are less likely to have
expanded since the previous year.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 EPL effect on firms’ minimum hire quality
We first consider the results from the event-study estimation framework described in Equa-
tion 2.2. Recall that the DiD estimates for 2001-2004 show the reform’s (dynamic) effect
on minimum hire quality minj,t{φˆi}, where φˆi are estimated AKM worker effects. DiD
estimates for 1993-1998 provide a test of the parallel-trends assumption for the pre-reform
period. Figure 2.1 displays these DiD estimates over time. With the exception of 1996
pre-reform DiD estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. While this is a de-
viation from parallel pre-reform trends in outcomes we argue that overall the assumption
17Age squared and age cubed are included to avoid capturing the effect of experience on wages in αˆi.
18To estimate Equation 2.3, we use reghdfe (Correia, 2016), which drops singletons (22.3% of individuals
and 38.9% of firms).
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Table 2.2: Firm characteristics by treatment status
A: Continuous characteristics
Treated Control
mean sd mean sd
Head count (rounded) 4.857 2.453 12.688 1.388
Firm age (years) 8.171 4.548 8.859 4.407
Mean worker age (years) 40.158 9.311 38.644 8.532
Female worker share 0.409 0.297 0.373 0.267
Mean worker years of schooling 11.418 1.450 11.356 1.222
Mean worker monthly wage (100 SEK 1980) 45.080 29.996 45.506 29.199
Mean worker AKM person effect (std, 1986-92) -0.007 0.998 -0.022 0.817
Estimated AKM firm effect (std, 1986-92) -0.007 0.992 0.038 0.995
Observations 87,441 13,947
B: Binary characteristics
Treated Control
Share Yes Frequency Share Yes Frequency
Privately owned 0.991 86,651 0.986 13,750
Manufacturing firm 0.090 7,881 0.132 1,845
Expanding firm 0.430 35,124 0.581 7,786
Downsizing firm 0.286 23,316 0.287 3,847
Stockholm county 0.227 19,845 0.230 3,212
Malmo (Skane county) 0.123 10,745 0.115 1,606
Gothemburg (Vastra county) 0.163 14,261 0.175 2,435
Observations 87,441 13,947
Note: This table summarizes treatment and control firms’ characteristics in 1999 for the main estimation sample.
Panel A provides mean and standard deviation of continuous variables. Panel B gives means and frequencies for
dummy variables.
of parallel counter-factual trends is likely to hold. We present specific evidence supporting
this claim in Section 2.6.7, where we perform placebo tests. For the years 2001-2004 Figure
2.1 shows a negative and persistent effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality. The
event-study framework suggests that there was strong anticipation in 2000, the year that
the LIFO reform was debated and passed in parliament. While the size of the anticipation
effect may be somewhat surprising it is intuitive that, if they respond, firms may adjust
their worker selection once they anticipate that firing workers becomes easier in the near
future.19
We next compare the EPL reform’s estimated effect on minimum hire quality across
our four different worker ability measures. Table 2.3 presents estimated DiD coefficients
for the specification in Equation 2.1. The difference between the columns is the worker
ability proxy underlying firms’ yearly minimum hire quality: estimated AKM worker effects
(1), military draft cognitive test scores (2), draft psychological test scores (3) and GPA
at age 15 (4). The outcome variables are standardized to make them comparable across
scores. The DiD results are not only qualitatively consistent across measures but also
19This is especially true given that the reform facilitates firing of recent hires only once they are no longer
the most recent hire.
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Figure 2.1: Dynamic EPL effect on minimum hire quality
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from an OLS
(ITT) specification without covariates other than year dummies. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects
estimated 1986-1992. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
quantitatively comparable. This impression is reinforced by looking at the event-study
graphs for the alternative ability measures: Figures 2.5-2.7 in the appendix reproduce the
event-study DiD graphs for cognitive ability, psychological aptitude and GPA. They show
similar dynamics as Figure 2.1. A somewhat more pronounced effect on minimum hire
quality as measured by GPAs (available for younger cohorts) may hint at a relaxation of
firms’ screening: it is plausible that relatively young hires, about whom firms may know
little but their school grades, may benefit disproportionately from laxer hiring standards.
Table 2.3: EPL effect on different minimum hire quality measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AKM COG NON-COG GPA
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0484*** -0.0603*** -0.0488*** -0.0724***
(0.0096) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0150)
Observations 314,144 193,025 189,923 132,281
Firms 101,388 79,923 79,210 63,909
Adjusted R2 0.0027 0.0062 0.0058 0.0071
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Dependent variable is one
of three minimum hire quality measures, based on: AKM worker effects estimated 1986-1992 (1), military draft
cognitive test scores (2), military draft psychological test scores (3), GPA at age 15 (4). Estimates are from OLS
(ITT) specifications without covariates other than year dummies and are all based on the sample of firms from (1).
The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
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2.4.2 Effect heterogeneity by reform bite
The EPL reform did not affect all treated firms equally. As we discuss in some detail
in Section 2.2, firms with two and three relevant workers experienced a near abolition of
employment protection, with the degree of EPL relaxation diminishing monotonically up
to firms with ten workers. The light gray diamonds in Figure 2.2 illustrate this variation
in reform bite. The figure also shows results from a DiD specification exploiting this
heterogeneity. It splits up the overall DiD term into separate DiD terms for each firm size
group (and uses firms with 14 workers as the reference group). The results, shown in dark
grey dots, are noisy, particularly further up the firm size distribution where there are fewer
observations. Still, the results in Figure 2.2 strengthen the case that firms’ minimum hire
quality responded to the reform. The absolute magnitude of the DiD estimates is greatest
for the smallest firms in our sample and near-monotonically falls with firm size.
Figure 2.2: EPL effect heterogeneity by firm size
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Note: The dark gray dots show firm size-specific DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire
quality from an OLS (ITT) specification without covariates other than year dummies. The year 2000 is excluded to
rule out anticipation effects. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects estimated 1986-1992. Vertical bars
denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The light gray diamonds illustrate
the bite of the reform in terms of the percentage change of workers protected by the seniority rule.
2.5 Mechanisms
2.5.1 Number of hires channel
Von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010) find that the 2001 EPL reform increased worker
flows both at the hiring and the firing margin. Is the drop in minimum hire quality at
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treated firms driven by a reform-induced increase in the hiring rate, mechanically lowering
minimum hire quality? To test this, we simulate a scenario where firms hire the same type
of workers before and after the reform, not changing their selectiveness. We implement
this by randomly re-shuffling new hires over time within firm size groups. For the re-shuffle
we use the sub-period from 1996-2004 and exclude the year 2000.20 This ensures that the
pre-and post-reform periods are of the same length so that there is approximately the same
mass of pre- and post-reform hires in the simulation data.
In our simulation the type of hires is the same before and after the reform by design. If
in reality, too, firms’ selectiveness had been unchanged by the reform, the counter-factual
exercise should leave the reform’s estimated effect on minimum hire quality the same as the
effect based on actual data. If, on the other hand, the estimated effect is attenuated by the
simulation, this gives us an indication that firms hired systematically different workers after
the reform. Figure 2.3 shows that in the counter-factual scenario, the reform’s effect is less
pronounced. Reassuringly, pre-reform coefficients are nearly identical but simulated reform
effects are attenuated. Point estimates for the actual and counter-factual reform effects on
minimum hire quality are given in Column (1) and (2) of Table 2.4. The estimated actual
effect is nearly twice as large in absolute value as the counter-factual one. This suggests
that a substantial part of the overall effect is driven not by firms hiring more workers
but by firms otherwise changing their hiring behavior. We argue below that the likeliest
candidate for a shift in firm hiring behavior is a change in firm selectiveness.
2.5.2 Risky hires channel
Theoretically, changes in firm selectiveness may come in at least two guises. One is that
firms are more willing to hire risky workers. That is, firms could refrain from screening
out candidates whose ability is so difficult to judge a priori that it may be either so low
the firm would not want to employ the worker or so high the worker would really boost
productivity at the firm. Before the reform, Sweden’s six-month probation period may not
have been long enough to give them confidence they would learn the new hire’s productivity
in time to fire the worker without extra hiring costs. After the reform, however, treated
firms may want to use their extra firing flexibility to harness the option value of risky
workers explored by Lazear (1995). That is, these firms may want to hire workers whose
ability is difficult to tell precisely because they can try to retain the workers that turn out
to be unusually productive and lay off those that are revealed to be unproductive. One
piece of evidence in favor of this mechanism is that the reform not only lowered minimum
but also increased maximum hire quality at affected firms - see column (3) of Table 2.4.
As above, though, this result may come about without a change in selectiveness as firms
hire more workers, thus drawing larger samples from the ability distribution. We therefore
20Potential anticipation effects make it difficult to unambiguously assign the year 2000 to before or after
the reform.
58
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND WORKER SELECTION
Figure 2.3: EPL effect and random hiring simulation
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Note: The light gray diamonds are yearly DiD estimates for a counter-factual effect of the EPL reform on minimum
hire quality from an OLS (ITT) specification. The data have been modified, leaving each firm’s actual number of
hires unchanged but randomly re-shuffling hired individuals across time within a firm size group. (The year 2000,
when anticipation is possible, is omitted from the re-shuffle). For comparison, the DiD estimates for actual minimum
hire quality are included as dark gray dots. Estimates are from OLS (ITT) specifications without covariates other
than year dummies and are all based on the sample of firms from (1). Hire quality is measured by AKM worker
effects estimated 1986-1992. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
use the same simulated data as above and estimate the reform’s counter-factual effect on
maximum hire quality in a scenario where, by design, firms cannot have changed their
selectiveness. Column (4) of Table 2.4 shows that unlike the drop in minimum hire quality,
the increase in maximum hire quality is entirely explained by the number of hires effect
in our simulation. The evidence therefore does not support the interpretation that firms’
intensified hiring of risky workers is the mechanism behind firms’ reduced selectiveness.
2.5.3 Lowered hiring threshold channel
An alternative mechanism, suggested by Pries and Rogerson (2005), is that loosened job
protection makes firms more willing to give a chance to workers who at first do not appear
very productive. The reform-induced drop in minimum hire quality may thus be driven
by firms lowering their hiring standard. For more direct evidence of a lowering of hiring
thresholds we look to firms’ network-based hiring. Hensvik and Skans (2016) provide
evidence that firms use their employees’ past co-worker networks for screening purposes.
We build on their result and use new hires’ past links with incumbents as a screening
proxy. The intuition is the following: if affected firms after the reform are happy to hire
workers of potentially lower ability, it is less important for them to obtain reliable signals
of new hires’ productivity, e.g., through employee referrals. If so, we would expect to see
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Table 2.4: EPL effect mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minimum Maximum
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0478*** -0.0253** 0.0309*** 0.0390***
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Observations 232,707 244,459 232,707 244,459
Firms 92,164 95,473 92,164 95,473
Adjusted R2 0.0028 0.0017 0.0026 0.0023
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Dependent variable: actual
minimum hire quality (1), counter-factual minimum hire quality (2), actual maximum hire quality (3), counter-
factual maximum hire quality (4). For the counter-factual effect estimate, the data have been modified, leaving each
firm’s actual number of hires unchanged but randomly re-shuffling hired individuals across time within a firm size
group. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects estimated 1986-1992. All estimates are from OLS (ITT)
specifications without covariates other than year dummies. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
the intensity of network-based hiring decrease at firms affected by the reform.21 As Figure
2.4 shows, this is indeed the case. The dynamics of the effect are very similar to those of
the effect on minimum hire quality.22 We interpret this as evidence that relaxed screening
in the form of a lowered hiring threshold is a key driver of the reform-induced drop in
minimum hire quality.
There are two caveats to this result. First, unlike our other results the estimates in
Figure 2.4 are from a specification adding firm fixed effects to Equation 2.2. Without
controlling for time-invariant firm heterogeneity in this way, pre-trends are not parallel, as
Figure 2.8 in the appendix shows. Second, including firm fixed effects results in parallel
pre-reform trends only back to 1994, as is clear from Figure 2.4. Barring a data issue we are
unaware of this suggests that some specific event differentially affected the network-based
hiring of treatment and control firms in 1993. Note, however, that trends are parallel again
as we go back further in time, as Figure 2.9 in the appendix illustrates.
2.6 Threats to identification
2.6.1 The Gender Equality Act
As pointed out in Section 2.2 there was an amendment to the gender equality act (GEA)
that roughly coincided with the 2001 LIFO reform. GEA, in force from 1992, called for
firms of ten employees or more to annually publish two documents specifying measures to
21We follow Hensvik and Skans (2016) in our definition of new hires’ co-worker links by counting the
number of incumbents who previously worked at the same firm and establishment as the new hire. To
ensure this measure is not mechanically related to firm size we divide new hires’ average number of co-
worker links to incumbents by the number of incumbents, giving us the share of incumbents the new hire
is linked to.
22Column (1) of Table 2.12 in the appendix shows that the effect size is also comparable to FE estimates
of the reform’s effect on minimum hire quality given in Table 2.7.
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Figure 2.4: EPL effect on network-based hiring
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on network-based hiring from a firm
fixed effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Network-based hiring is measured by new
hires’ average share of incumbents with whom they previously worked at another firm. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
promote gender equality.23 Effective in 2001, the wording of these requirements was made
more concrete. Importantly, however, it did not fundamentally change their content (SFS,
1991, 2000).24 In light of the modest legal changes it is unlikely that the GEA’s effect on
firm’s hiring abruptly increased in 2001. This view is reinforced by the fact that compliance
with the GEA’s provisions was neither monitored nor enforced through sanctions. Still,
the 2001 re-phrasing of the legal text may have reflected growing awareness of gender
inequality and rising pressure to do something about it. In this case firms with 10 or more
workers (mostly contained in our control group) may have felt more obliged to promote
gender equality in their hiring choices. It appears likely that they would have responded by
marginally favoring women in hiring, thus relaxing their hiring standard. In difference-in-
difference terms, this is equivalent to a tightening of the hiring standard of the unaffected
small firms (our treated group). As a consequence, if the 2001 strengthening of GEA had a
perceptible effect on larger firms’ hiring standards for women, it should bias our estimated
EPL reform effects towards zero. To provide suggestive evidence whether this is the case
we separately estimate the effect of the EPL reform on minimum female and male hire
quality. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 are consistent with such an interpretation: the
point estimate for women is less pronounced than that for men.
23The mandate for an annual gender equality action plan was introduced in 1992 and called for, e.g.,
measures to promote women in male-dominated positions through training and recruitment. The mandate
to publish an equal pay action plan was added in 1994 and asked firms to report on gender differences in
pay and ways of removing them.
24The requirement for an annual gender action plan was largely re-stated and the equal pay action plan
mandate was re-worded to specify in more concrete terms what comparing women’s and men’s pay should
entail (SFS, 1991, 2000).
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Table 2.5: EPL effect on minimum hire quality by gender and on firm attractiveness
(1) (2) (3)
Women Men E-E hires
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0353*** -0.0522*** 0.0109
(0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0084)
Observations 180,194 192,387 314,144
Firms 76,453 78,853 101,388
Adjusted R2 0.0012 0.0019 0.0022
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Dependent variable: female
hires’ minimum AKM worker effect (1), male hires’ minimum AKM worker effect (2), share of hires transitioning
directly from employment at a high-wage firm (above-median estimated AKM firm effect) (3). Estimates are from
OLS (ITT) specifications without covariates other than year dummies and are based on the sample of firms from
Column (1) in Table 2.3. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
2.6.2 Demand vs. supply
We have been using an equilibrium outcome (observed hires) to infer something about
firms’ (qualitative) labor demand. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that labor
supply remained constant, i.e., that workers’ self-selection into firms was not systematically
affected by the LIFO reform. To bias our results away from zero, the reform would have
had to make affected firms less attractive employers. Theoretically the reform’s value
for new hires is ambiguous: in the short run it made treated firms more attractive as
the lowest-tenure worker need no longer be laid off first. In the medium run, however,
the reform reduced the value of seniority capital as second- and third-lowest tenure no
longer afforded protection from layoffs. Beyond this, attractiveness was unchanged. A
conclusive empirical answer to this question would require data on applicants, which we
lack. We can, however, look at job changes that were likely voluntary and therefore contain
information about firms’ attractiveness as employers. As a proxy for voluntary job changes
we use the share of new hires who worked at a high-wage firm right up to starting their
new job.25 As Column (3) of Table 2.5 shows, the LIFO reform has no significant effect on
voluntary employment-to-employment transitions. We view this as suggestive evidence that
the reform did not make treated firms less attractive to workers and that our assumption
of unchanged (qualitative) labor supply is valid.
2.6.3 Non-classical measurement error in worker ability
It is likely that our estimated AKM worker effects measure worker ability with substantial
error. Those instances of such measurement error are unproblematic that affect our control
and treated firms in the same way. As we estimate individual ability before our analysis
period and in other firms, this is plausible in most cases. Take an example: to the extent
that there is any wage discrimination in the labor market, women’s wages (and thus AKM)
25We define as high-wage firms those with a firm fixed effect estimate (from our AKM specification)
above the median, irrespective of size.
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will systematically understate their ability. However, thanks to our DiD-setting, this will
not be a problem unless we underestimate to a particularly large extent the ability of
women hired into treated firms from 2001 on, which is unlikely. However, a related problem
would be if the reform increased the share of women hired: in this case, the share of
underestimated ability would have increased and that might bias minimum hire quality
downward. We test this possibility in Column (1) of Table 2.6. There is no detectable
effect of the 2001 reform on the female hire share, allaying this concern.26
Table 2.6: EPL effect on female hire share and AKM coverage
(1) (2)
Share Women Share AKM
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0040 -0.0196**
(0.0085) (0.0089)
Observations 314,144 314,144
Firms 101,388 101,388
Adjusted R2 0.0014 0.0292
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Dependent variable: female
hire share (1), share of hires for whom an estimated AKM worker effect is observed (2). Estimates are from OLS
(ITT) specifications without covariates other than year dummies and are based on the sample of firms from Column
(1) in Table 2.3. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
2.6.4 Selective worker ability measurement
We do not observe worker ability for all new hires. In 1999, at the average firm in our
estimation sample we have an estimated AKM worker effect for 55.4% of new hires. Our
DiD setting and ability measurement ensure that this is only problematic if the share of
new hires whose ability we can measure is positively affected by the reform. Similarly to
the number of hires effect described in Section 2.5.1, this may mechanically drive down
minimum hire quality even if firms’ selectiveness remains unchanged. To test for this in our
sample, Column (2) of Table 2.6 reports results from using firms’ share of new hires with
an AKM worker effect estimate as an outcome. It shows we do not observe the ability of
relatively more hires at treated firms. In fact, the point estimate is negative and significant,
implying that, if anything, selective ability measurement will bias our results towards zero.
26An analogous source of bias would be that (i) the EPL reform made firms hire younger workers and
(ii) AKM underestimates young workers’ ability. Table 2.13 in the appendix suggests this is not the case,
as mean age of new hires increased in response to the reform.
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2.6.5 Time-invariant firm heterogeneity
Consider a scenario in which the composition of small firms deteriorates over time, so that
small firms observed after the reform are negatively selected as compared to those observed
before. Suppose that the composition of large firms remains unchanged. A credit boom
with lots of new entrants, for example, may produce such a pattern. This scenario could
theoretically deliver similar results as our study in the absence of any EPL-induced change
of selectiveness in hiring. The danger of such a confounding scenario is somewhat reduced
by the fact that we condition on firms existing in 1999. However, it can be ruled out
by controlling for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Column (2) of Table 2.7
reports results from a fixed-effects version of our DiD specification. While this reduces the
size of our estimated effect by roughly a quarter, the reform’s negative effect on minimum
hire quality remains strongly significant.27
Table 2.7: EPL effect on minimum hire quality: FE and IV
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE IV
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0484*** -0.0359*** -0.1162***
(0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0207)
Observations 314,144 314,144 314,144
Firms 101,388 101,388 101,388
Adjusted R2 0.0027 0.0010 .
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. (1) OLS (ITT); (2) FE
(ITT) (3) 2SLS (LATE). All specifications include only year dummies as covariates. Dependent variable: minimum
hire quality. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects estimated 1986-1992. The year 2000 is excluded to
rule out anticipation effects. The first-stage F statistic for (3) is 5563.93.
2.6.6 Endogenous firm size and overcorrection
Column (3) of Table 2.7 reports an estimate of the reform’s local average treatment effect
(LATE). The two-stage least squares specification uses size in 1999 as an instrument for
time-varying actual firm size. It zooms in on the reform’s effect on those firms that, based
on their 1999 size, were likely to also be small enough to benefit from the reform from
2001 onward. The LATE addresses the possibility that the ITT effect used in our main
specifications is overly conservative as it classifies firms no longer benefiting from the reform
as treated and vice versa. As expected, the LATE results are more pronounced than our
main (ITT) results.
27Figures 2.10-2.13 in the appendix show that adding firm fixed effects to Equation 2.2 yields results that
are qualitatively the same as OLS, though noisier.
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2.6.7 Non-parallel counter-factual trends: firm size
Our results may be spurious if minimum hire quality in different firm size groups had
deviated from parallel trends even in the absence of the reform. While this is impossible
to ascertain for the firm sizes actually affected by the reform, placebo estimates comparing
firms further up the firm size distribution provide a sense of how likely non-parallel counter-
factual trends in minimum hire quality are. To this end we define as placebo treated and
placebo control those firms that are 10, 20 and 30 workers bigger than our actual treated
and untreated firms. This gives us placebo firm size cut-offs at 20, 30 and 40 workers.
Table 2.8 gives the results from estimating Equation 2.1 on these placebo treatments.
Reassuringly, none of the DiD estimates of the placebo effects are statistically significant.
Table 2.8: EPL effect on minimum hire quality: placebo tests
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo firm size cut-off 20 30 40
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 0.0016 -0.0061 -0.0012
(0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0050)
Observations 109,735 54,044 33,130
Firms 22,331 9,063 4,902
Adjusted R2 0.0051 0.0064 0.0088
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Placebo tests. (1) placebo
TR: firms with 12-20 workers, placebo CT: 21-25. (2) placebo TR: 22-30, placebo CT: 31-35. (3) placebo TR: 32-40,
placebo CT: 41-45. All specifications include only year dummies as covariates. Dependent variable: minimum hire
quality. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects estimated 1986-1992. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out
anticipation effects.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we study the effect of reduced employment protection on firms’ worker se-
lection. By doing so, we provide empirical evidence on a less obvious way in which labor
market regulation affects both efficiency (through the quality of worker-firm matches) and
equity (through the opportunities of the least productive workers).
To obtain quasi-experimental variation in employment protection we use the 2001 re-
laxation of Sweden’s seniority rule. This allows us to test if reduced dismissal costs make
firms less stringent in their worker selection and if so, how. Using individual-level data
for the universe of Swedish workers and several ability measures, we find that the EPL
reform lowers minimum hire quality at affected firms by about 5% of a standard devia-
tion. This result is robust to addressing various scenarios that threaten the validity of our
identification strategy.
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To isolate the portion of the EPL effect on minimum hire quality due to a change in
firms’ selectiveness we implement a counter-factual simulation. We find that about half of
the overall EPL effect is explained by an increase in the hiring rate, which mechanically
lowers minimum hire quality, whereas the other half represents a change in the selectiveness
of firms’ hiring. This is our first main finding: employment protection legislation directly
affects who gets hired.
We devise tests to investigate two mechanisms that may be driving the effect on firms’
hiring selectivity. The first possible mechanism is that firms hire riskier workers as dismissal
costs fall (Lazear, 1995), implying a widening of the spread of hire quality both at the
bottom and the top. To test for it, we look at the response of maximum hire quality to
the EPL reform. We do not find evidence for this channel.
The second possible mechanism is that employers respond to looser employment pro-
tection by lowering their hiring standard, i.e., the productivity threshold above which they
hire applicants (Pries and Rogerson, 2005). We build on the literature on network-based
hiring, in particular, Hensvik and Skans (2016), to obtain direct evidence for a change in
firms’ screening of workers. Our analysis of new hires’ past co-worker links with incumbents
at their new firm suggests that the reform makes employers rely less on their employees’
networks to screen potential recruits. We conclude that a lowering of firms’ hiring standard
drives the EPL effect on firms’ selectiveness in hiring. Our second key result is thus that
EPL affects firms’ worker selection by shifting their hiring threshold as suggested by Pries
and Rogerson (2005).
Our finding that employment protection directly affects firms’ worker selection is consis-
tent with the scarce evidence that already exists (Marinescu, 2009; Bjuggren and Skedinger,
2018). We go beyond these papers by establishing a causal effect on the ability of new hires
and by providing direct evidence for a change in screening intensity.
This is the first study to provide evidence on the mechanisms by which EPL influences
firms’ worker selection, i.e., how dismissal costs affect the selectiveness of firms’ hiring. By
empirically assessing the predictions of different theoretical models we hope to inform the
modelling choices of future theoretical work on worker-firm matching.
Following the 2018 general election in Sweden, the Swedish government re-opened de-
bate on a possible loosening of employment protection legislation that would exempt more
firms from the LIFO rule. The implication of our results for this policy discussion is that a
further reduction of employment protection may make it yet easier for the least productive
job-seekers to get a foot in the door. This points to an intuitive trade-off in the design
of labor market policy between safeguarding the job security of insiders and making work
attainable for the weakest outsiders.
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Appendix
Table 2.9: Data sources
Data source Period used Description Used for measurement of Variables used/generated
JOBB 1986-2004 Employment spells Worker flows Timing and identity of hire
JOBB 1993-2004 Employment spells Firm size Monthly head count
JOBB 1993-2004 Employment spells Other firm characteristics Industry, age, location, ownership
JOBB 1986-2004 Employment spells Worker labor market history Co-workers
WSS 1986-1992 Wage survey statistics Wages Full-time equivalent monthly wages
LISA 1990-2004 Various information Worker characteristics Highest educational qualification
BAKGRUND n.a. Birth register Worker characteristics Year of birth, gender
KRIGSARKIVET 1970-2004 Military draft information Worker ability Cognitive, psychological test scores
A˚RSKURS9 1988-1997 Grade 9 school grades Worker ability GPA at age 15
Table 2.10: EPL effect on minimum hire quality: mechanisms, with outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minimum Maximum
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0473*** -0.0249** 0.0341*** 0.0375***
(0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Observations 235,187 245,211 235,187 245,211
Firms 92,774 95,689 92,774 95,689
Adjusted R2 0.0027 0.0017 0.0026 0.0024
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Data include worker
inflow outliers. Dependent variable: actual minimum hire AKM (1), counter-factual minimum hire AKM (2), actual
maximum hire AKM (3), counter-factual maximum hire AKM (4). For the counter-factual effect estimate, the data
have been modified, leaving each firm’s actual number of hires unchanged but randomly re-shuffling hired individuals
across time within a firm size group. All estimates are from OLS (ITT) specifications without covariates other than
year dummies. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
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Table 2.11: EPL effect on minimum hire quality: firm size corrections
(1) (2) (3)
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0484*** -0.0469*** -0.0621***
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0089)
Observations 314,144 312,152 347,798
Firms 101,388 99,873 124,328
Adjusted R2 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Different versions of
reform bite measure: (1) head count -1 all firms; (2) head count - managers and family where known, -1 otherwise;
(3) unadjusted head count. All estimates are from OLS (ITT) specifications without covariates other than year
dummies. Dependent variable: minimum hire quality. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker effects estimated
1986-1992. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
Table 2.12: EPL effect on network-based hiring
(1) (2)
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 -0.0347*** -0.0311***
(0.0059) (0.0059)
Observations 618,260 659,637
Firms 121,242 121,701
Adjusted R2 0.0071 0.0078
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Estimates are from firm
fixed-effects specifications without covariates other than year dummies. Dependent variable: network-based hiring,
measured by new hires’ average share of incumbents with whom they previously worked at another firm. (1) is for
the period 1994-2004. (2) is for 1993-2004. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
Table 2.13: EPL effect on age of hires
(1)
Mean hire age
DiD estimate (Treated*Post)=1 0.5032***
(0.1018)
Observations 314,144
Firms 101,388
Adjusted R2 0.0264
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Dependent variable: age of
new hires. Estimates are from OLS (ITT) specifications without covariates other than year dummies and are based
on the sample of firms from Column (1) in Table 2.3. The year 2000 is excluded to rule out anticipation effects.
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Figure 2.5: EPL effect on minimum hire cognitive test score
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from an
OLS (ITT) specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in Figure
2.1. Hire quality is measured by cognitive test scores from the military draft. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 2.6: EPL effect on minimum hire psychological test score
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from an OLS
(ITT) specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in Figure 2.1.
Hire quality is measured by psychological test scores from the military draft. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 2.7: EPL effect on minimum hire grade point average
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from an
OLS (ITT) specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in Figure
2.1. Hire quality is measured by GPA at age 15. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
Figure 2.8: EPL effect on network-based hiring
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on network-based hiring from an OLS
specification without covariates other than year dummies. Network-based hiring is measured by new hires’ average
share of incumbents with whom they previously worked at another firm. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 2.9: EPL effect on network-based hiring (FE)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on network-based hiring from a firm
fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Network-based hiring is measured by new
hires’ average share of incumbents with whom they previously worked at another firm. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 2.10: EPL effect on minimum hire quality (FE)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from a firm
fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. Hire quality is measured by AKM worker
effects estimated 1986-1992. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
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Figure 2.11: EPL effect on minimum hire cognitive test score (FE)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from a firm
fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in Figure
2.1. Hire quality is measured by cognitive test scores from the military draft. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 2.12: EPL effect on minimum hire psychological test score (FE)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from a
firm fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in
Figure 2.1. Hire quality is measured by psychological test scores from the military draft. Vertical bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 2.13: EPL effect on minimum hire grade point average (FE)
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Note: This figure shows yearly DiD estimates for the effect of the EPL reform on minimum hire quality from a firm
fixed-effects specification without covariates other than year dummies. The sample of firms is the same as in Figure
2.1. Hire quality is measured by GPA at age 15. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
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Chapter 3
Do estimated individual fixed effects capture
worker ability?
Authors: Sebastian Butschek and Jan Sauermann
Abstract: In this paper we assess the performance of estimated worker effects as an
ability proxy. We focus on worker effects from two-way fixed-effect log-wage regressions as
introduced by Abowd et al. (1999). Using Swedish register data, we study the correlation
between such worker effect estimates and standardized cognitive test scores from the
military draft. For the period from 2007 to 2013 we find a correlation of roughly .4.
We show that this is more than three quarters of the predictive performance achieved
by machine-learning algorithms. However, we find that the worker effects’ prediction
performance varies with observed worker and firm characteristics—for example, across
industries. Moreover, we identify biases—for instance, the worker effects underestimate
cognitive test scores for blue-collar workers. Our analysis of the worker effects’ determi-
nants shows that they “contain” a significant amount of both skill-related and non-skill
attributes such as education and cognitive ability as well as age. Finally, our exploration
of the importance of estimation ingredients for prediction performance broadly supports
the estimation choices of existing applications.
Keywords: cognitive ability, test scores, unobserved productivity, AKM.
JEL Codes: J00, J24, J31.
3.1 Introduction
As direct measures of individual ability are scarce, a growing body of empirical work in
applied microeconomics uses estimated productivity proxies. Following Abowd et al. (1999,
henceforth AKM), a range of papers interpret estimated worker effects from two-way fixed-
effects log wage regressions as a broad measure of time-invariant worker ability. Opposing
this tendency, there is an increasing theoretical consensus, backed up by some empirical
evidence, that there are problems with the interpretation of AKM worker effects as a
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productivity proxy. These criticisms notwithstanding, AKM worker effects continue to be
used to approximate individual ability—often, because they are relatively easy to obtain
or because of a lack of ready alternatives. Moreover, while several papers have made a
strong theoretical case for what AKM effects are not, it remains unclear what AKM effects
are. AKM worker effects, in particular, are a blackbox. That is, we do not know what
characteristics or estimation biases they reflect.
In this paper we bring empirical evidence to bear on these questions. Leveraging the
availability of a high-quality measure of cognitive ability in Swedish register data, we (i)
assess estimated AKM worker effects’ performance as an ability proxy; (ii) study how this
performance varies across worker and firm observables; (iii) explore AKM worker effects’
potential bias; (iv) describe their empirical contents, i.e., their determinants; and (v) inves-
tigate the consequence of estimating AKM worker effects under certain data constraints.
To answer these questions we make descriptive comparisons between standardized test
scores for cognitive ability (COG) and estimated AKM worker effects.
We find an overall AKM-COG correlation of nearly .4, which our machine-learning
benchmarks suggest is sizeable. Our results further show that observed firm and worker
characteristics predict both the size of the AKM-COG correlation and whether AKM
worker effects systematically over- or underestimate COG. Our attempt to open the AKM
blackbox suggests that AKM worker effects “contain” both skill—such as education, cog-
nitive and non-cognitive ability—and other worker or job attributes that command wage
premia—such as age, occupation type and industry. Finally, we are able to provide some
practical guidelines for AKM estimation when the goal is to use approximate worker abil-
ity. For instance, we find that an estimation interval of six years’ length harnesses nearly
all the information on individual ability that AKM worker effects are able to extract in an
interval as long as 14 years.
The AKM method uses a two-way fixed-effects regression to decompose log wages into
a firm component related to the time-invariant characteristics of the employer and a worker
component related to the time-constant characteristics of the individual. This approach
assumes that firm and worker pay premia are additively separable, so that the firm pay
premium is independent of the characteristics of the worker: regardless of the precise
worker hired, wages are higher at more productive firms. Moreover, AKM estimations
assume that conditional on time-invariant worker and firm characteristics and time-varying
observables, worker mobility is exogenous. The original application of the AKM method is
a study of sorting in the French labor market. AKM use the correlation between estimated
AKM worker and firm effects (as proxies of fixed characteristics) to measure the degree
of assortative matching (Abowd et al., 1999). Their approach has been replicated using
data on other countries, sometimes with modifications or extensions (Abowd et al., 2002;
Iranzo et al., 2008; Gruetter and Lalive, 2009; Bagger et al., 2013; Card et al., 2013, 2015;
Alvarez et al., 2018; Barth et al., 2018; Lopes de Melo, 2018; Song et al., 2018).
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Interest in labor market sorting is not only the source of a string of replications but
also supplies a key critique of the AKM method. Equilibrium sorting models argue that
if there are complementarities between worker and firm productivity, wages will not be
monotonic in firm productivity (e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011; Hagedorn et al., 2017).
For example, a bad worker may earn less at a good firm than at a bad firm as the good
firm will only hire him at a very low wage to compensate it for foregoing a more productive
hire. As a consequence the AKM firm effects will not be correlated with firm productivity
(Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011). In the presence of search frictions, their model implies that
wages may also not be monotonic in worker productivity. A good worker in a bad match
may earn less than a slightly less productive worker in a good match. This may result in
AKM worker effects not being correlated with worker productivity.
A second major critique of the AKM method concerns the assumption on (condition-
ally) exogenous mobility, which rules out specific instances of endogenous mobility (e.g.,
Abowd et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2018).1 One example is mobility to high-wage firms
of high-productivity workers whose ability is revealed only gradually in the pre-move job.
Such a pattern would attribute too little of the wage premium to the worker and too much
to the firm (Card et al., 2013; Abowd et al., 2018). A second example is mobility driven by
specific labor demand shocks, which will also overstate the firm pay premium (Card et al.,
2013).2 A final example of endogenous mobility ruled out by AKM is that the current wage
realization (e.g., from a match-specific productivity component) influences future mobility.
There is empirical evidence for the US and Sweden that current match-specific heterogene-
ity in wages affects whether and to what type of firm a worker moves in future (Abowd
et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2018). The resulting biases of estimated AKM worker and
firm effects may undermine the use of AKM effects as measures of worker skill and firm
productivity (Abowd et al., 2018).
Despite these potential or actual problems there are numerous applications that inter-
pret AKM worker effects as a measure of individual ability. This may in part be due to
the attention received by Card et al. (2013, henceforth CHK), who use the AKM method
to study the contribution of employer pay heterogeneity and assortative matching to a rise
in West German wage inequality. Both pre-dating CHK and citing their work, a string of
papers takes the AKM method beyond the study of labor market sorting and uses AKM
worker effects as an explicit proxy for time-invariant worker characteristics (e.g., Fox and
1This is different from the critique that identification of AKM firm effects in practice is undermined by
limited mobility bias, i.e., that too few of firms’ workers are movers (Abowd et al., 2004; Andrews et al.,
2008, 2012; Borovicˇkova´ and Shimer, 2017).
2Consider a worker that regularly moves between two industries. Industry A experiences strong cyclical
fluctuations so that it pays high wages during an upswing but jobs are quickly destroyed in a downswing.
Industry B offers stable jobs at lower wages. If the worker moves to an A firm during an A upswing and
moves back to a B firm when the A boom ends, AKM firm effects will exaggerate the firm-specific wage
component. This is because the estimation attributes wage changes accompanying worker movements to
time-invariant firm premia although they are partly driven by labor demand shocks.
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Smeets, 2011; Abowd et al., 2012; Davidson et al., 2014; Krishna et al., 2014; Balsvik and
Haller, 2015; Schmutte, 2015; Carlsson et al., 2016; Macis and Schivardi, 2016; Cornelissen
et al., 2017; Roca and Puga, 2017; Butschek, 2017; Bender et al., 2018; Gathmann et al.,
2018; Bombardini et al., 2019; Butschek and Sauermann, 2019a).3 Another explanation for
the use of AKM worker effects as ability proxies is the scarcity of alternatives. High-quality
direct measures of cognitive ability are available in only a few data sets. The best-known
example is the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) contained in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). Also well-known are military draft test
scores for men’s cognitive ability from the Swedish Armed Forces.4
Motivated by the continued popularity of AKM worker effects as a proxy for individual
ability and the dearth of substantive justification for doing so, we attempt to provide direct
empirical evidence for the strengths and weaknesses of AKM worker effects as an ability
proxy. To this end we estimate the type of AKM specification implemented by CHK on
a sample of Swedish men for the seven years from 2007 to 2013. We then compare the
estimated AKM worker effects to cognitive test scores from the Swedish military draft in
simple descriptive analyses to answer five sub-questions.
First, how well do AKM worker effects approximate cognitive test scores? We use
the correlation between the two measures as our main performance indicator. We find an
AKM-COG correlation of nearly .4. To help assess whether this makes AKM worker effects
a good ability proxy we benchmark it with machine-learning predictions of cognitive test
scores based on the same labor market data. While the machine-learning algorithms do
better, AKM worker effects achieve three quarters of their predictive performance. This
finding will not end the debate on the merits of AKM worker effects as an ability proxy, but
it is the first one that puts a simple number on AKM worker effects’ predictive performance.
Second, does the quality of AKM worker effects as a cognitive ability proxy vary across
worker and firm characteristics? Comparing the AKM-COG correlation across observables,
we find considerable heterogeneity. In particular, the correlation improves with age, is
higher for white-collar than blue-collar occupations and varies strongly across industries.
It is similar across educational categories and regions. The main use of these findings is
practical—to help identify settings in which the use of AKM worker effects is more and
less justified.
Third, are AKM worker effects biased? To identify systematic exaggeration or under-
statement of cognitive ability we regress AKM prediction error on the worker and employer
characteristics we observe. Our findings suggest that AKM worker effects underestimate
3AKM person effects have also been used as a proxy for other dimensions of time-invariant individual
heterogeneity (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2016). Analogously to AKM, education economists have used two-
way fixed-effects regressions with test scores as an outcome to estimate teacher or school value added (e.g.,
Rothstein, 2010). In this literature fixed effects are also interpreted as capturing ability, though the focus
is on teachers or schools.
4Test scores from the military draft have been used, amongst others, by Lindqvist and Vestman (2011);
H˚akanson et al. (2015); Fredriksson et al. (2018).
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cognitive ability for younger workers, blue-collar workers, more educated workers and edu-
cators. These results do not directly map onto the theoretical debate on sources of bias in
the AKM method. By contrast, our finding that the (downward) bias of AKM worker ef-
fects for firm movers as compared to stayers is negligible in size is relevant to the literature
on AKM mobility biases, though we cannot distinguish types of mobility so as to identify
potential countervailing effects.
Fourth, what individual characteristics do AKM worker effects contain? Regressing
estimated AKM worker effects on COG, non-cognitive test scores and typically observed
worker and firm characteristics we find that ceteris paribus, most variation in AKM worker
effects is explained by education and age. This is followed by occupation type, non-cognitive
test scores and COG, all of which are also contained in AKM worker effects in economically
significant quantities. The contribution of our analysis is to improve our empirical handle
on what AKM worker effects actually are—which may have both theoretical and practical
relevance.
Fifth, how is the quality of AKM worker effects as an ability proxy affected by the way
they are estimated? We show that the AKM-COG correlation varies only slightly across
four non-overlapping 7-year estimation intervals; that hourly wages are a key estimation
ingredient unless part-time workers can be excluded from the AKM estimation; that the
performance of AKM worker effects as ability proxies is reduced, but still acceptable, when
(employed) workers are not observed for the entire estimation period; that longer estimation
intervals increase the predictive performance of AKM worker effects, but only up to six
years; that including dummies for the level of education reduces the AKM-COG correlation
only slightly; and that estimating AKM specifications for men and women jointly does not
undermine AKM worker effects’ performance as an ability proxy for men. These findings
may facilitate estimation decisions for researchers approximating ability with AKM worker
effects.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 AKM estimation
The starting point of this paper is the two-way log-wage fixed-effects specification intro-
duced by Abowd et al. (1999). The estimates of time-invariant individual wage premia
this yields are widely referred to as AKM worker effects. To obtain AKM worker effects
for our analysis we closely follow CHK by estimating the following specification:
ln(w)ijt = αi + ψj + γt + x
′
itβ + rijt, (3.1)
where ln(w)ijt is individual i’s log wage at firm j in year t. αi denotes additive fixed
effects for individuals i and ψj denotes additive fixed effects for firms j. γt is a set of
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year dummies and xit is a vector of time-varying individual-level controls: age squared,
age cubed and interactions of education categories with year dummies, age squared and
age cubed. This allows time effects and second- and third-degree age effects to vary by
educational category.5 For comparability we also follow CHK in estimating the AKM
specification separately for men.6 We only deviate from CHK in our wage measure: they
use wages unadjusted for hours worked but exclude part-time workers. Our data allow us
to make an approximate distinction between full-time and part-time workers for a subset
of workers; for this subset, however, we can do even better by using full time-equivalent
(FTE) wages, which is what we opt for in our main analyses.7
To be able to estimate αi for a worker it is necessary to have at least two observations for
this individual. Similarly, ψj is not identified for firms that only have a single employee and
for firms whose workers are never employed elsewhere, i.e., those that are not connected to
other firms by worker movements. We obtain AKM worker effect estimates αˆi for 80.13%
of the workers for whom we observe a monthly FTE wage and estimates of ψj for 42.68%
of firms.8 While this may seem low in comparison to, e.g., CHK, the main driver of the
difference is that our register data contain self-employed individuals, whereas the social
security records underlying CHK’s estimations do not.
3.2.2 AKM approximation quality and bias
Throughout the paper, we use standardized versions of AKM worker effects and COG. To
evaluate the performance of estimated AKM worker effects as predictors of cognitive test
scores, we focus on the Pearson sample correlation coefficient between AKM worker effects
and COG, the AKM-COG correlation r =
∑N
i=1(AKM−µAKM )(COG−µCOG)√∑N
i=1(AKM−µAKM )2
√∑N
i=1(COG−µCOG)2
, where
µAKM and µCOG are AKM worker effect and COG means.
The correlation coefficient is an easily interpretable measure for the predictive perfor-
mance of AKM worker effects but it is blind to the direction in which AKM worker effects
go wrong when approximating COG. To get a sense of whether AKM worker effects sys-
tematically under- or overestimate COG we consider prediction error PE = AKM −COG
as a measure of the bias of AKM worker effects.
5Note that Equation (3.1) does not include non-interacted education category dummies. This follows
the formulation in CHK; their reason for excluding education levels is not given. Presumably, one reason
is that for most people education does not vary over time. Perhaps a more important reason is that CHK
want to absorb time-invariant educational human capital in the worker fixed effect.
6We explore the effects on AKM worker effects’ predictive performance of including women in the AKM
estimation in Section 3.4.5.
7We explore the value added from hourly wages in Section 3.4.5.
8We rely on reghdfe (Correia, 2016) for our estimation of Equation (3.1). This module drops singletons
(19.41% of individuals and 47.52% of firms).
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3.2.3 Machine learning as a benchmark
It is difficult to know what correlation constitutes good predictive performance. Both
cognitive test scores and the labor market/demographic data underlying AKM worker
effects have stochastic components. Because of this randomness even an algorithm that
fully captures the data-generating process will not perfectly predict cognitive ability. This
implies that the correlation between any cognitive ability predictor and cognitive test scores
will never be one—there is an irreducible prediction error.
Estimated AKM worker effects were not specifically designed to approximate cognitive
ability; that they may be used as a (cognitive) ability proxy is a beneficial side effect. When
predicting cognitive ability is the explicit goal, it is likely that one can do significantly better
than estimating AKM worker effects by training an algorithm specifically for the task of
predicting cognitive ability—for example, by using machine learning.9
Why might one still rely on AKM worker effects to approximate worker ability? The
key advantage is that an AKM regression model does not need training and testing, making
it feasible in settings where no explicit information on cognitive ability is available. By
contrast, ML algorithms are trained by minimizing their mean squared error (MSE) in
predicting observed cognitive ability.10 Model assessment also requires information on
cognitive ability.
In light of this, the point of comparing the predictive performance of AKM worker
effects and ML algorithms is not to help decide which one to use. Instead, the idea is to
use machine learning as a benchmark—to obtain an (upper-bound) estimate of the size
of the irreducible error of a cognitive ability prediction based on labor market data. The
performance of AKM worker effects as an ability proxy can then be gauged against the
correlation a state-of-the-art prediction algorithm achieves based on the same data.
We consider three ML algorithms: a gradient boosting model, a bootstrap-aggregated
decision tree (bagging) model and a random forest model.11 These are so-called ensemble
methods that differ in how they combine several decision trees. A decision tree is an
algorithm that partitions the feature space into regions and uses the mean outcome in
each region to make predictions. The splits chosen by decision trees are often sensitive to
particular observations, implying that decision tree predictions may vary a lot depending
on the particular sample the trees have been trained on. Gradient boosting, bagging and
random forest models are different tools for reducing the variance of decision trees—by
training several trees on derivatives or sub-sets of the training data and aggregating their
predictions. A gradient boosting model trains decision trees sequentially (each on the
9Given input-output pairs and one or more ways of making predictions, supervised machine learning
uses chooses a range of parameters to optimize the prediction of outputs based on the inputs it observes.
10MSE = 1
N
∑N
i=1(AKM − COG)2.
11Admittedly, this selection is arbitrary. Our main reason for choosing gradient boosting, bagging and
random forests was that these models are both powerful and have been implemented in open-source software.
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prediction residuals from the previous one) and adds their predictions. A bagging model
randomly draws several samples of the same size as the training set from the training data
with replacement, trains a decision tree on each of them, obtains a prediction from all
trees and averages them. A random forest proceeds like a bagging model but increases tree
differentiation by using only a random sub-set of features each time it looks for an optimal
split of the feature space.12
For training, model assessment and prediction we utilize the ML algorithm implemen-
tations in Python’s SciKitLearn. We use data on 2000-2006 for ML training and model
assessment, and data on 2007-2013 for benchmarking the predictive performance of AKM
worker effects. We focus on the balanced panel in each data set, i.e., the subset of workers
we observe for the full seven years (2000-06 or 2007-13).13 The data we use for train-
ing, model assessment and prediction include cognitive test scores and the information (at
yearly frequency) that underlies the AKM estimation: log wages, firm ID, education cat-
egories, age squared and age cubed (see Equation (3.1)). We standardize the continuous
explanatory variables other than firm ID. We randomly split the 2000-2006 data in half,
creating a training and a validation set. Having trained the algorithms, we compare their
predictive performance in the validation set, choosing the one with the lowest MSE. We
then use the best algorithm’s prediction performance for cognitive ability in 2007-2013 as
a benchmark for AKM worker effects for 2007-13.
3.3 Data
Labor market information We have individual-level register data from Statistics Swe-
den (SCB) for the period 1986-2013. In the bulk of our analyses we focus on AKM worker
effect estimates for the years 2007-2013. The estimation sample includes men aged 18-65
who earn non-zero wages from paid employment in November of a given year.14 To esti-
mate our main AKM worker effects we use full time-equivalent (FTE) contractual wages
from the Wage Survey Statistics (WSS). WSS only covers the workers of a subset of firms
(45.76% of observations for our main estimation period).15 We use the CPI to deflate
wages and winsorize at .5% and 99.5% of the annual wage distribution to exclude extreme
outliers. We obtain firm identifiers, industry, location and worker occupation from Job-
12See, e.g., James et al. (2013) for an introduction to machine learning.
13SciKitLearn’s ML tools best handle panel data in wide format and cannot deal with missing values.
14Women are excluded as we have no military draft test scores for almost all of them.
15WSS wage data’s partial coverage of firms and workers may reduce the quality of AKM worker effects.
Reassuringly, this suggests the AKM-COG correlation we find is a lower-bound estimate of AKM worker
effects’ prediction performance.
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bregistret (JOBB), a data base of individual-level employment spells.16 Information on age
and education is drawn from other registers—see Table 3.10 in the appendix for details.17
We also estimate Equation (3.1) on the earlier years in three intervals: 1987-1992, 1993-
1999 and 2000-2006. The age distribution of workers we observe in the WSS data looks
similar across periods apart from showing particularly big birth cohorts in the mid-1940s
and the late 1960s (see Panel (a) of Figure 3.13). Having AKM worker effect estimates
from non-overlapping estimation intervals allows us to study differences in the predictive
performance with increasing worker age (see Section 3.4.2) and across time periods (see
Section 3.4.5). 18
Cognitive test scores Our cognitive ability measure comes from Sweden’s military
enlistment, which was compulsory from 1969 to 2005 for male Swedes aged 18-19. Draft
testing took place over two days and included assessment of cognitive ability, physical
fitness, health status, and psychological aptitude for the demands of war.19 Between 1970
and 1996, well over 90% of Swedish-born males were tested at age 18 or 19. Between 1997
and 2005 this gradually fell to about 70%, before rapidly declining (see Figure 3.14 in the
appendix). As a consequence of this timing, our AKM estimation intervals differ in terms
of the age groups for whom we have military draft test scores. We primarily focus on the
years 2007-2013 because the age distribution of workers with cognitive test scores has the
broadest support in this interval (see Panel (b) of Figure 3.13 in the appendix).
The cognitive ability scores we use are based on performance in four dimensions: verbal
reasoning; logical induction; metal folding; and technical comprehension. Each sub-test
contains 40 questions, is graded on a scale from 1 to 9, and is then transformed to a
discrete, “stanine” distribution by the enlistment agency. We use the average of these
four sub-scores and standardize it within cohort to give it mean zero and unit variance
(Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011; H˚akanson et al., 2015) and again across cohorts to make it
comparable over time.20
While the draft test scores, relatively speaking, are a high-quality measure of cognitive
ability, they are not without limitations. Although they are based on performance in four
dimensions, they cannot hope to capture all aspects of cognitive ability. Moreover, they
are surely measured with error - not just because they reflect performance on one or two
single days but also because not everyone participating will have tried their best to impress
16JOBB has total monthly wage earnings unadjusted for the number of hours worked and no information
on labor supply. We only use these unadjusted wages in Section 3.4.5 to explore how the prediction
performance of AKM worker effects is affected by the quality of the wage measure.
17LISA, the register that contains education information, is available only from 1990. We impute the
level of education for 1986-1989 from 1990 (or the first time an individual is observed in LISA).
18We also use the raw 2000-2006 data to train our ML algorithms.
19For more detailed information on the military enlistment, see, e.g., Lindqvist and Vestman (2011).
20For the test years 1969 to 1994, the cognitive test scores were kept unchanged; they were subject to
slight revisions after that (H˚akanson et al., 2015).
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the enlistment officers. Finally, additional measurement error may arise as cognitive ability
increases or decreases over time. This is not unreasonable in the space of half a lifetime,
though fluid intelligence is viewed as relatively stable over time.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Correlation AKM worker effects and COG
We first assess the closeness of the link between AKM worker effects (estimated 2007-13)
and military draft test scores for cognitive ability. Figure 3.1 provides a non-parametric
illustration of the AKM-COG relationship. The binned scatter plot considers equal-sized
bins of standardized cognitive test scores and shows the averages of the standardized AKM
worker effect estimates for each of them. Figure 3.1 suggests the relationship is positive
and close to linear.
Figure 3.1: Non-parametric relationship AKM worker effects and cognitive ability
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Note: This figure gives a binned scatter plot of standardized AKM worker effects (estimated 2007-2013) and cognitive
test scores (standardized separately for each year and overall).
The Pearson sample AKM-COG correlation is .398 among the 881,490 male workers for
whom we have both measures (see Column (1) of Table 3.1).21 As a first gauge for whether
this makes AKM worker effects a good proxy for cognitive ability we check how frequently
AKM worker effects and COG are in the same quartile. Column (2) of Table 3.1 shows
this is the case in 35.9% of cases. To put this into perspective: if AKM worker effects
held no information about cognitive ability, AKM worker effect and COG quartiles should
21Spearman’s ρ, a rank correlation coefficient, is very similar, see Table 3.7 in the appendix.
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coincide in roughly 25% of cases. Column (2) of Table 3.1 implies that as a proxy for COG
quartiles AKM worker effect quartiles outperform chance by 10.9 percentage points or by
43.6%.
Table 3.1: Estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive ability
(1) (2)
Correlation r Share same quartile
AKM worker effects and COG .398 .359
Observations 881,490 881,490
Note: Estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores are standardized to mean zero and unit variance. (1)
displays their correlation coefficient; (2) shows the share of individuals for whom the estimated AKM worker effect
and the cognitive test score fall in the same quartile.
Benchmarking the prediction performance of AKM worker effects A further
way to judge whether an AKM-COG correlation of .398 makes AKM worker effects a
good cognitive ability proxy is to ask how high the correlation could possibly be given
the data the AKM method uses—after all both cognitive test scores and the labor mar-
ket/demographic information underlying AKM worker effects have a random component.
To get a sense of how much information about cognitive ability can be extracted from
the data used by AKM estimations we look at the correlation with cognitive test scores
achieved by the prediction from a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm.
We use data on the years 2000-2006 to train three ML algorithms and choose between
them. Out of the three tree-based algorithms we consider, the gradient boosting model
marginally outperforms the bagging and the random forest models.22
Table 3.2 compares the predictive performance of AKM worker effects and gradient
boosting. Column (1) reports our baseline AKM-COG correlation for 2007-13 as in Table
3.1, though for the sub-set of workers who are observed in the labor market throughout
2007-2013 (our ML algorithms require a balanced panel for making a prediction). Column
(2) reports the correlation of the gradient boosting model’s cognitive ability prediction for
2007-13 with actual COG. The table shows that the AKM-COG correlation is lower than
the ML-COG correlation. However, estimated AKM worker effects achieve 77.99% of the
predictive performance of the top ML algorithm we trained.
3.4.2 Size of correlation varies with worker and firm characteristics
We explore the heterogeneity of the link between AKM worker effects and COG by looking
at their correlation separately by various observed worker and firm characteristics.
22Mean squared error in the validation set is smallest for the gradient boosting model—see Table 3.8 in
the appendix.
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Table 3.2: Benchmarks for AKM worker effects as ability proxies
(1) (2)
AKM worker effects Boosting
Correlation r with COG .450 .577
Observations 356,958 356,958
Note: AKM worker effects, out-of-sample ML predictions and cognitive test scores have been standardized to mean
zero and unit variance. Columns (1) and (2) compare the prediction performance of AKM worker effects and a
gradient boosting model. Both correlations are computed for the sample of workers observed throughout 2007-13.
Worker age We have two pieces of evidence that AKM worker effects are a better ability
proxy for older than for younger workers. One is given by Panel (a) of Figure 3.2, which
takes a group of workers and compares the correlation between their (time-invariant) COG
and their AKM worker effects, estimated in four non-overlapping time periods. It shows
that the correlation is .387 for 1986-92, at the start of which workers are 27-33 years old.
This correlation increases gradually to .457 for 2007-13 (in 2007 workers are 48-54 years
old). A drawback of this comparison is that it conflates the effect of age with that of any
longer-run macro-economic changes, such as business cycles.23 The second piece of evidence
is a comparison of AKM-COG correlations between different age groups within the same
AKM estimation interval.24 This avoids capturing time effects at the cost of making inter-
cohort comparisons. As Figure 3.2 Panel (b) shows, this comparison confirms that the
AKM-COG correlation increases with age.25 It additionally suggests that the correlation
plateaus around .47 after age 40.
Worker education and occupation Our second heterogeneity result is that the AKM-
COG correlation varies non-monotonically with education and is higher for white-collar
than for blue-collar workers. Moreover, the correlation is lower conditional on either occu-
pation or education than overall. Figure 3.3 Panel (a) compares the AKM-COG correlation
across educational categories. It shows a correlation of around .26 for most categories. For
workers with a PhD, however, it is markedly lower (r=.140)26 and for those with only some
post-secondary education, it is somewhat lower (r=.219).That AKM worker effects are a
worse proxy for cognitive ability within educational categories implies that some of the
overall correlation between AKM worker effects and COG comes from differences in both
23We further explore the effect of the time period in Section 3.4.5.
24Age groups 2-5 in Figure 3.2 Panel (b) are chosen to match the beginning-of-period ages in Figure 3.2
Panel (a).
25The variation in AKM worker effects is much lower than that in COG for younger workers (see Table
3.9 in the appendix). This would be consistent with higher-cognitive ability individuals entering the labor
market later and/or displaying experience wage profiles with a similar intercept and a steeper slope.
26PhD holders have more variation in their AKM worker effects than in their COG (see Table 3.9 in the
appendix), which may explain some of their lower AKM-COG correlation.
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Figure 3.2: AKM worker effect prediction performance by worker age
(a) Same cohorts, different periods
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Note: Panel (a) shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores for four non-
overlapping AKM estimation intervals. The same seven cohorts (born 1953-1959) are followed across the four
intervals. Panel (b) shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores for different
age groups, all from the same AKM estimation interval (2007-2013).
average cognitive ability and AKM worker effects between educational groups.27 Figure 3.3
Panel (b) shows a comparison between occupation types. AKM worker effect prediction
performance is .248 for white-collar workers, .226 for intermediate occupations and .145 for
blue-collar workers. Again, much of the overall AKM-COG correlation seems to be com-
ing from between-occupation variation in cognitive test scores and AKM worker effects.
Among white-collar workers, AKM worker effects are a less good proxy for cognitive ability
than overall, but still nearly twice as good as for blue-collar workers. That the AKM-COG
correlation is so low for blue-collar workers is mirrored by much less variation in their AKM
worker effects than their COG (see Table 3.9 in the appendix). This may in turn be due to
greater wage compression and lower prevalence of variable pay in blue-collar occupations.
Employer characteristics: industry and location Our third heterogeneity result is
that the correlation between AKM worker effects and COG varies considerably across in-
dustries but hardly across regions. Figure 3.4 Panel (a) compares AKM-COG correlations
across industries, assigning workers employed in several industries to the one they spent
most time in. AKM worker effects work best as cognitive ability proxies in manufacturing
(r=.449) and worst in the hospitality sector (r=.200) and extra-territorial organizations
(there are very few observations in the last). We do not see a clear pattern in the het-
27Note that the AKM specification adopted from CHK (see Equation (3.1)) contains interactions of
education dummies but not education dummies by themselves. This explains why the AKM worker effect
estimates capture considerable between-education variation in cognitive ability.
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Figure 3.3: AKM prediction performance by worker education and occupation
(a) Educational categories
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Note: Panel (a) shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores by the worker’s
highest educational category during the estimation interval (2007-2013). Panel (b) gives correlations between esti-
mated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores by workers’ most frequent (modal) type of occupation during
the estimation interval (2007-2013).
erogeneity between industries. It is noteworthy though that the AKM-COG correlation
conditional on industry is higher than that conditional on education or occupation. Figure
3.4 Panel (b) presents region-specific correlations between AKM worker effects and COG.
Workers moving between counties during the AKM estimation interval are again assigned
to the modal county. There is little variation across counties in AKM worker effect predic-
tion performance, with the AKM-COG correlation ranging between .350 and .435 for all
but two counties. AKM-COG correlations conditional on place of work are thus similar to
the unconditional correlation.
3.4.3 Bias of AKM worker effects
We now ask whether AKM worker effects are simply a noisier proxy for COG in some
circumstances than in others or whether AKM worker effects systematically under- or
overestimate COG in a way that is related to characteristics we observe. AKM prediction
error, our bias measure, subtracts standardized cognitive test scores from standardized
estimated AKM worker effects. It is roughly normally distributed and centered around
zero, as Figure 3.15 in the appendix shows.
Worker ability We first regress AKM prediction error (for COG) on COG and non-
cognitive test scores (NONCOG) without control variables.28 Table 3.3 shows that, hold-
28NONCOG are also from the military draft, evaluated by a certified psychologist on the basis of a semi-
structured 25-minute interview of the conscript. Designed to assess the individual’s ability to cope with the
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Figure 3.4: AKM prediction performance by employer characteristics
(a) Industry (SNI 92, sections)
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Note: Panel (a) shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores by the worker’s
most frequent (modal) industry during the estimation interval (2007-2013). Panel (b) gives correlations between esti-
mated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores by workers’ modal place of work (county) during the estimation
interval (2007-2013).
ing NONCOG constant, a one standard deviation (SD) higher COG is associated with
a prediction error that is .616 SDs lower. This means that AKM worker effects tend to
overestimate COG in the lower half of the COG distribution and underestimate it in the
upper half. This finding is consistent with Figure 3.1, where the fitted line has a slope
smaller than one. That AKM worker effects “underestimate” COG for high levels of COG
need not, however, imply that AKM worker effects are biased as a proxy for productivity
more broadly. It would also be sufficient for this result that (i) COG does not perfectly
determine productivity in the labor market and that (ii) productivity differences are not
fully captured by wages, both of which seem plausible.
The coefficient on NONCOG is .187, less than a third as large in absolute magnitude.
Its positive sign implies that, conditional on COG, AKM worker effects overestimate COG
more the higher the level of NONCOG. This result can be consistent with the positive
correlation between COG and NONCOG (r=.362 in our sample) if COG and NONCOG
are also positively associated with AKM worker effects. That AKM worker effects show
attenuation bias as a cognitive ability proxy may reflect bias with respect to (more readily)
observed characteristics, too. For which workers at what type of firms do AKM worker
effects over- or underestimate cognitive ability? To address this question we regress AKM
prediction error on age, education, occupation, movement between firms, industry and
psychological requirements of military service and war, the test score reflects the following character traits:
willingness to assume responsibility, independence, an outgoing character, persistence, emotional stability,
and power of initiative (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011).
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Table 3.3: AKM bias with respect to worker ability
AKM prediction error
Military draft cognitive test score (std) -0.6162***
(0.0010)
Military draft non-cognitive test score (std) 0.1870***
(0.0010)
Observations 803,822
Adjusted R2 0.3313
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Dependent variable is AKM
prediction error, i.e., AKM worker effects minus COG. AKM worker effects estimated 2007-2013. The regression
includes no control variables.
place of work. The results are given by Figures 3.5-3.7, which report different groups of
OLS coefficients from the same regression. For comparison, they have the same x-axis
range.
Worker characteristics Figure 3.5 reports coefficients on the year-of-birth dummies
(with the 1974 birth cohort serving as reference category). The estimates reveal that,
conditional on the other observables, bias is positively and monotonically related to age:
AKM prediction error is nearly 1 standard deviation greater for the oldest workers (born
1951) than for the youngest (born 1992). The primary reason for this is likely to be that
wages tend to increase with age (while our cognitive ability measure is time-invariant) and
that the specification in Equation (3.1) cannot account for worker age because it includes
year dummies.
Figure 3.5: AKM bias with respect to worker cohort
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Note: This figure shows estimates from a regression of standardized AKM prediction error (std. AKM worker effects-
std. COG) on worker and firm characteristics. The OLS coefficients shown are for the worker’s year of birth. 95%
confidence intervals are displayed (based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors).
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Figure 3.6 shows point estimates for education categories, occupation type and for
whether the worker switched firms. The estimated coefficients suggest, first, that bias is
negatively related to the level of schooling. That is, AKM worker effects overestimate COG
more for workers with lower education than for workers with higher education. Given that
average COG is higher at higher levels of schooling29 this is consistent with the finding
above that AKM prediction error is negatively related to cognitive ability. The magnitude
of the association between education and AKM prediction error is sizeable: compared
to workers with some college, a college degree (reference category) or a doctorate, AKM
prediction error is a quarter to a third of a standard deviation greater for those with
completed or some high school, and one half to two thirds of a standard deviation higher
for those with only compulsory schooling or less. Note that this is conditional on other
observables. For instance, less than compulsory schooling will mostly be found among
older workers but this positive link between age and bias is not captured by the education
coefficients.
Figure 3.6: AKM bias with respect to education, occupation and movement between
firms
Less than compuls. schooling
Compulsory schooling (9 years)
Some high school (1-2 years)
High school (2-3 years)
Some college (<3 years)
College (3 or more years)
PhD
White collar
Intermediate
Blue collar
Firm stayer
Firm mover
-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75
OLS coefficient (SD)
Note: This figure shows estimates from a regression of standardized AKM prediction error (std. AKM worker effects-
std. COG) on worker and firm characteristics. The OLS coefficients shown are for educational categories, type of
occupation and a dummy for movement between firms during the estimation period (2007-2013). 95% confidence
intervals are displayed (based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors).
Figure 3.6 further shows that, compared to intermediate occupation types, AKM worker
effects overestimate COG for white-collar workers and underestimates it for blue-collar
workers. The gap is large, with AKM prediction error about two fifths of a standard
29The correlation between COG and a rough measure for years of schooling (imputed from the highest
educational qualification) is .486.
92
AKM WORKER EFFECTS AS ABILITY PROXIES
deviation larger for white- than for blue-collar workers. This is an interesting result in
that it goes in the opposite direction than the findings for education. While wages (the
central ingredient of AKM worker effects) seem to dampen differences in cognitive ability
across educational categories (conditional on occupation type), they appear to exaggerate
difference in cognitive ability across occupation types (holding education constant). Finally,
Figure 3.6 shows that AKM bias is negligibly different between firm movers and firm
stayers. This is notable in that endogenous mobility ruled out by the AKM method has
been identified as a potential source of bias (e.g., Abowd et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al.,
2018). As we do not distinguish different types of mobility we cannot rule out that AKM
worker effects systematically over- or underestimate cognitive ability for specific types of
movers. However, our results do suggest that while the negative AKM bias for firm movers
is statistically significant, the point estimate is very small compared to other sources of
bias.
Figure 3.7: AKM bias with respect to employer characteristics
(a) Industry (SNI 92, sections)
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Note: Both panels show estimates from the same regression of standardized AKM prediction error (std. AKM worker
effects-std. COG) on worker and firm characteristics (AKM worker effects estimated 2007-2013). They include 95%
confidence intervals based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Panel (a) reports OLS coefficients for the
worker’s modal industry during the estimation period. Panel (b) reports OLS coefficients for the worker’s modal
place of work during the estimation period.
Firm characteristics Figure 3.7 Panel (a) reports coefficient estimates for the industry
dummies. Wholesale and retail trade/repair of vehicles and household goods serves as the
reference category. Though there is some heterogeneity across industries in AKM bias this
heterogeneity lacks an obvious pattern. The three industries where AKM prediction error
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is largest in absolute magnitude are mining, education and financial intermediation. For
mining, AKM prediction error is .296 standard deviations greater than for the reference
category, for financial intermediation it is .557 standard deviations greater and for edu-
cation it is .354 standard deviations smaller.30 Heterogeneity in AKM bias by employer
location is relatively limited other than for Stockholm, where prediction error is nearly
a quarter of a standard deviation larger than in the reference county (Ga¨vleborg)—see
Figure 3.7 Panel (b).
3.4.4 Determinants of AKM worker effects
So far we have been exploring the validity of AKM worker effects as a cognitive ability
proxy. We have shown that AKM worker effect estimates do correlate with cognitive
ability, though this link displays both heterogeneity and biases. In this section we widen
the focus and explore the determinants of AKM worker effects more generally. To study the
empirical contents of estimated AKM worker effects we simply regress them on the worker
and firm characteristics also considered above. In doing so we want to not only know what
information AKM worker effects contain about workers and their jobs but also learn about
the relative importance of these determinants. Figures 3.8-3.10 present estimated OLS
coefficients from a regression of AKM worker effects on worker age, education, occupation
type and movement between firms as well as employer industry and location. Their x-axes
have the same range for comparability.
Worker characteristics Figure 3.8 reports the coefficient estimates for birth cohort
dummies. The reference year is 1973. Very simply put the graph shows that age is a
major determinant of AKM worker effects. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, this makes sense
given that Equation (3.1) cannot control for age. It is possible of course that some of
the age component of AKM worker effects is a productivity increase as workers acquire
human capital in the course of their career. However, it seems unlikely that age-related
productivity gains make up much of the overall age effect: first, the age premium is flat or
even decreasing for the youngest twelve cohorts. If productivity improvements were driving
the age effect we would expect the premium to grow fastest in the early years. Second,
the age premium keeps rising right up to our second oldest cohort whose workers are 61 in
our last estimation year. We would not expect productivity to keep rising so quickly up
until a few years before retirement. As a consequence we consider most of the age effect a
statistical artefact of the AKM estimation procedure.
Figure 3.9 is the centerpiece of this section. It reports the coefficients on dummies for
cognitive and non-cognitive ability quartiles, educational categories, occupation types and
30Academic economists may find it consoling that (i) their wages do not do justice to their cognitive
ability and (ii) that the size of this understatement is second only to the size of the overstatement enjoyed
by bankers.
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Figure 3.8: Worker age as a conditional AKM determinant
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Note: This figure shows estimates from a regression of standardized AKM worker effects (estimated 2007-2013) on
worker and firm characteristics. The OLS coefficients shown are for worker year of birth dummies. 95% confidence
intervals are displayed (based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors).
movement between firms. With the exception of the firm mover dummy all of these worker
characteristics are economically significant determinants of AKM worker effects. Educa-
tional categories are the strongest determinants, with the estimated average difference in
AKM worker effects between the lowest-educated and PhD holders equal to 1.16 standard
deviations. There appears to be little difference in AKM worker effects between workers
with compulsory schooling and some high school (both around .26 SDs below the reference
category). Similarly, there is only a small difference in AKM worker effects between work-
ers with some post-secondary education (the reference category) and those with only high
school. A regular college degree is associated with about a quarter of a SD higher AKM
worker effects.
Among the worker characteristics shown in Figure 3.9 occupation types are second most
important for explaining differences in AKM worker effects: white-collar workers’ AKM
worker effects are nearly .8 standard deviations higher than those of blue-collar workers,
with intermediate occupations, the reference category, closer to white-collar workers. Next
are non-cognitive abilities as proxied by the military draft test scores: the average difference
in AKM worker effects between the top and bottom test score quartiles is .353 standard
deviations. Finally cognitive test scores also explain a considerable amount of variation in
AKM worker effects: the interquartile range is .225 SDs. Importantly, these are all ceteris-
paribus statements. That is, for instance, the difference in AKM worker effects between
the top and bottom cognitive test score quartiles of .225 SD is for a comparison of workers
with similar levels of education and in the same type of occupation. This is likely to be part
of the explanation for why non-cognitive test scores explain a bigger share of variation in
AKM worker effects than cognitive test scores when holding education constant : cognitive
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Figure 3.9: Ability, education, occupation and movement between firms as conditional
AKM determinants
Cog. ability quartile=1
Cog. ability quartile=2
Cog. ability quartile=3
Cog. ability quartile=4
Non-cog. ability quartile=1
Non-cog. ability quartile=2
Non-cog. ability quartile=3
Non-cog. ability quartile=4
Less than compuls. schooling
Compulsory schooling (9 years)
Some high school (1-2 years)
High school (2-3 years)
Some college (<3 years)
College (3 or more years)
PhD
White collar
Intermediate
Blue collar
Firm stayer
Firm mover
-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75
OLS coefficient (SD)
Note: This figure shows estimates from a regression of standardized AKM worker effects (estimated 2007-2013) on
worker and firm characteristics. The OLS coefficients shown are for cognitive and non-cognitive ability quartiles,
educational categories, type of occupation and a dummy for movement between firms during the AKM estimation
period. 95% confidence intervals are displayed (based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors).
test scores vary more systematically with the level of education than do non-cognitive test
scores.31
Firm characteristics Figure 3.10 presents coefficient estimates for firm characteristics.
Panel (a) shows considerable heterogeneity in average AKM worker effects across indus-
tries with financial intermediation at the top and education at the bottom of a range of
1.07 standard deviations (extra-territorial organizations contains too few observations for
reliable interpretation). AKM worker effect averages also vary across counties, though
this variation is less pronounced (see Panel (b) of Figure 3.10). Stockholm stands out for
AKM worker effects .307 standard deviations higher than Uppsala, the reference county,
and Ja¨mtland is at the bottom of the range at .185 standard deviations below Uppsala.
The upshot from looking at firm-level determinants is that AKM worker effects contain
considerable industry premia and non-negligible location premia. This is surprising: as
firms do not frequently change industries or locations, we would have expected the firm
fixed effects in the AKM specification in Equation (3.1) to absorb these differences. It is
possible, though, that these premia are unequally distributed across jobs, workers or units
within firms. One example of how this could come about is labor shortages in certain
region-industry-occupation cells that drive up wages (and thus AKM worker effects) for
only some workers in a firm so that the resulting wage premia are not fully captured by
firm fixed effects.
31The correlation of a rough years of schooling measure is .486 with COG and .271 with NONCOG.
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Figure 3.10: Employer characteristics as conditional AKM determinants
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Note: Both panels show estimates from the same regression of standardized AKM worker effects on worker and
employer characteristics (AKM worker effects estimated 2007-2013). They include 95% confidence intervals based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Panel (a) reports OLS coefficients for the worker’s modal industry during
the estimation period. Panel (b) reports OLS coefficients for the worker’s modal place of work during the estimation
period.
3.4.5 Size of correlation varies with estimation parameters
In this section we investigate how the correlation between AKM worker effects and COG
depends on how the former are estimated.
Wage measure The first estimation ingredient we look at is the quality of the wage
measure. Our main estimations use full time-equivalent (FTE) monthly wages. Many
administrative data sources, while providing wage information, do not contain hours worked
or the information necessary to infer FTE/hourly wages. How much the lack of hourly wage
information undermines the ability of AKM worker effects to approximate cognitive test
scores will depend on the degree of variation in labor supply and on the selection of workers
into part-time or overtime. To quantify the importance of FTE or hourly wages for AKM
worker effects as a cognitive ability proxy we compare two sets of AKM worker effect
estimates, with each set estimated on the same sample: one set that use total monthly
wages (unadjusted for hours) and one set that use FTE wages. We first do this for all
workers and then separately for part-time and full-time workers.
Table 3.4 presents the results. As Column (1) shows, the AKM-COG correlation is
nearly halved when hours worked are not adjusted for and all workers are included in
the AKM estimation. We next consider the case when AKM worker effects are estimated
only for full-time workers (defined as working at least 35 hours a week). The idea behind
this is that some administrative data sources contain only rough hours information. For
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Table 3.4: AKM prediction performance by availability of working hours info
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All workers FT workers (≥35 hrs.) PT workers (<35 hours)
r without hours info .219 .394 .127
r with hours info .398 .415 .354
Observations 881,490 756,078 213,218
Note: This table compares the correlation between estimated AKM worker effects (2007-2013) and cognitive test
scores for different samples depending on whether information on working hours is used/available. Column (1) looks
at all workers; (2) looks at full-time workers with 35 or more contractual weekly hours; (3) looks at part-time workers
with less than 35 weekly hours.
instance, CHK use the information available in the German social security records to drop
part-time workers and marginally employed workers and estimate their AKM specification
only on full-time workers. Column (2) shows that the AKM-COG correlation for full-time
workers is only marginally higher when hours-adjusted wage data are used, suggesting that
limiting the AKM estimation to full-time workers is a valid strategy when this is possible.
Column (3) looks at part-time workers. As expected, the AKM-COG correlation is reduced
markedly when wages are not adjusted for hours worked, though the correlation remains
positive.
Panel completeness The second estimation issue we address concerns panel complete-
ness. Because our wage data come from a survey that covers only a subset of firms we have
an unbalanced panel even for those workers that are actually continuously employed. We
limit our attention to those workers who, according to the complete labor market records,
are employed throughout our 7-year estimation window.32 Among these workers there is
still variation in the number of years during which they are observed in the FTE wage data
and thus variation in the number of years on which our AKM worker effect estimate for
them is based. Figure 3.11 explores how this affects the AKM-COG correlation. Pearson’s
r increases from .334 for workers observed for only 2 years to .450 for workers observed
throughout the period.33
Estimation period Boom-and-bust cycles may affect the ability of AKM worker ef-
fects to capture individual ability. Also, CHK find that the correlation between estimated
worker and firm effects changes over time in Germany, presumably reflecting structural
changes in the labour market. Here we ask whether macro changes have an impact on how
much information AKM worker effects contain about workers’ cognitive ability. Table 3.5
compares the correlation between AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores across four
32Conditioning on continuous employment ensures that we do not capture selection into inactiv-
ity/unemployment or composition effects (such as workers entering the labor market partway through
the estimation period).
33Half of workers are observed throughout, with the rest approximately evenly distributed across the
shorter durations, see right y-axis of Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: AKM prediction performance by number of years worker is observed
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Note: This figure shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects (from 2007-2013) and cognitive test
scores by the number of years the worker is observed in the WSS data during the estimation interval.
seven-year intervals among workers aged 27-33. We look at the same age groups in each
estimation interval to avoid capturing age effects. The correlations fluctuate between .37
and .41 across estimation intervals without a monotonic trend. The pattern may, however,
reflect the business cycle: Sweden experienced a financial crisis with high unemployment
between 1992 and 1998. Most of this falls into our second estimation interval. The Great
Recession, contained in our final estimation interval, also affected Sweden, with unemploy-
ment peaking in 2009 and 2010. The AKM-COG correlation is lower in the crisis estimation
intervals, but the difference is not large.
Table 3.5: AKM prediction performance by estimation time period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013
r .392 .382 .409 .372
Observations 159,432 158,562 198,140 165,957
Note: This table compares the correlation between AKM worker effects estimated in four different intervals and
cognitive test scores. In each interval, the correlations are computed for workers aged 27-33.
Length of estimation interval Another choice (or constraint) faced by researchers
applying the AKM method to approximate worker ability is the length of the panel used
for AKM estimation. We use non-overlapping seven-year estimation intervals because
this allows us to split our observation period into four windows of equal length. CHK,
addressing a different question, choose overlapping intervals of seven to eight years. Here we
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look at how the length of the estimation interval affects the quality of AKM worker effects as
an ability proxy. Figure 3.12 compares the AKM-COG correlation across AKM estimations
that differ in the length of the underlying panel. To avoid composition effects, it only
considers individuals who are observed throughout and who are of a similar age. The results
suggest that estimation intervals longer than six years do not improve the performance of
AKM worker effects as ability proxies: the AKM-COG correlation is between .38 and .39
for all estimation intervals that are at least six years long. Using a shorter estimation
period does reduce the AKM-COG correlation, though it is still surprisingly high (over
.33) for AKM worker effects estimated on a two-year panel.
Figure 3.12: AKM prediction performance by length of estimation interval
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Note: This figure shows correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores for estimation
intervals of different lengths. AKM-COG correlations are computed only for those workers aged 27-33 in 1987 (birth
cohorts 1954-1960) who are observed in the labor market throughout 1987-1999.
Deviating from CHK Finally we consider selected deviations from the AKM specifi-
cation chosen by CHK and followed in this paper. We focus on two variations that may be
of particular interest to applications seeking to use estimated AKM worker effects as prox-
ies for individual productivity. We ask how the AKM-COG correlation is affected when
(i) education is explicitly controlled for and (ii) when women are included in the AKM
specification. Table 3.6 reports the results with Column (1) replicating the AKM-COG
correlation for the AKM specification used throughout this paper. Column (2) confirms
the finding from Section 3.4.4 that AKM worker effects capture variation in cognitive
ability over and above between-education levels differences in COG: adding dummies for
levels of education to the AKM estimation reduces the AKM-COG correlation only slightly.
Whether it makes sense in applications to include education dummies in the AKM specifi-
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cation is another matter. It may, for instance, depend on whether the researcher wants to
focus on differences in cognitive ability not reflected by the level of education or is looking
for a very broad measure of human capital.
Column (3) suggests that including women into the AKM estimation has a negligible
effect on the AKM-COG correlation. This means that estimating AKM worker effects
for men and women jointly does not reduce the predictive performance of AKM worker
effects for men. It does not, by itself, constitute evidence that AKM worker effects serve
similarly well as cognitive ability proxies for women. We refrain from making AKM-COG
comparisons for the small number of women for whom we have military test scores as these
are likely to be a highly selected sample.
Table 3.6: AKM prediction performance—deviations from CHK
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Education dummies Men and women
r .398 .384 .394
Observations 881,490 881,490 882,633
Note: This table compares the correlation between estimated AKM worker effects (2007-2013) and cognitive test
scores for different AKM specifications that compare to the specification in Equation (3.1) and CHK as follows: (1)
is unchanged (used throughout the paper); (2) includes education category dummies; (3) includes women.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an empirical assessment of AKM worker effects as an ability
proxy. We use Swedish register data that includes both detailed labor market information,
allowing us to estimate AKM regressions, and standardized test scores for cognitive ability
at age 18. Our approach to assessing approximation quality is simple: we take COG as
a measure of true ability and look at the correlation between AKM worker effects and
COG. We find an AKM-COG correlation of about .4 and use machine-learning algorithms
trained to predict COG as a benchmark. They outperform AKM worker effects, but AKM
worker effects achieve over three quarters of their prediction performance. We are inclined
to conclude from this that overall AKM worker effects are a valid proxy for individual
ability.
The remainder of the paper explores qualifications to this assessment. We first un-
cover substantial heterogeneity in the prediction performance of AKM worker effects: they
“work” better for older workers, white-collar workers and certain industries. Our attempt
to discern whether the prediction deficit for some groups reflects systematic mis-estimation
or noise suggests that there are biases: for example, AKM worker effects underestimate
the cognitive ability of young workers, blue-collar workers and highly educated workers.
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By contrast, we do not find evidence for mobility bias on average, though we cannot di-
rectly investigate AKM worker effects’ potential biases associated with specific patterns of
endogenous mobility. As a consequence the lack of an overall mobility bias may well mask
countervailing biases for sub-groups of firm movers. When we open the AKM worker effect
blackbox and regress them on a set of worker and firm characteristics we find that on the
one hand, AKM worker effects contain time-invariant skill-related attributes one would like
them to—such as the level of education, cognitive ability and non-cognitive ability. On
the other hand, they also contain potentially time-varying features less closely related to
individual skill, such as age or industry; while the age premium is a plausible mechanical
consequence of the estimation strategy, one might have expected firm fixed effects to absorb
most industry differences in pay.
One recommendation arising from these findings is the following: when AKM worker
effects suggest ability differences, it is important to rule out that these are driven by some
of the characteristics shown here to bias them, such as age or occupation type. The final
sub-section of the paper offers further practical implications; it is explicitly addressed to
researchers wishing to use AKM worker effects as ability proxies. Our analyses show that
having information on either hourly pay or full-time/part-time status is key for reasonable
prediction performance; that longer estimation intervals are better than shorter ones but
in a strongly concave way; that balanced panels are superior but unbalanced ones are not
much worse; that in Sweden, the prediction performance of AKM worker effects does not
vary much across four non-overlapping estimation intervals; and that estimating AKM
worker effects jointly for men and women does not perceptibly reduce their prediction
performance for men.
We hope these findings will provide some input to the methodological debate on the
relationship between AKM worker effects and underlying worker productivity. We also
hope that they offer useful guidance on the circumstances in which AKM worker effects
are reasonable ability proxies.
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Appendix
Figure 3.13: Worker age distribution by estimation interval
(a) Male workers with AKM
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(b) Male workers with both COG and AKM
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Note: Both panels show estimated kernel densities for the age distribution within each AKM estimation interval.
Panel (a) shows the age distributions of those workers with an estimated AKM worker effect and Panel (b) gives
the age distributions of the subset of workers for whom both a cognitive military test score and an estimated AKM
worker effect is available.
Table 3.7: Correlations between estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive ability
(1) (2)
Pearson’s r Spearman’s ρ
AKM and COG .398 .396
Observations 881,490 881,490
Note: Estimated AKM worker effects and cognitive test scores are standardized to mean zero and unit variance. The
columns give different sample correlation coefficients: (1) is Pearson’s r; (2) is Spearman’s ρ.
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Figure 3.14: Cognitive test score coverage
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Note: This figure gives the share of Swedish-born males in the 2007-2013 WSS data for whom cognitive test scores
are available.
Table 3.8: Benchmarks for AKM worker effects as ability proxies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AKM Boosting Bagging Random forest
Validation set MSE - .639 646 .653
r with COG .450 .577 .576 .580
Observations 356,958 356,958 356,958 356,958
Note: Predictions and cognitive test scores have been standardized to mean zero and unit variance. r is their
correlation coefficient. The columns compare the prediction performance of AKM worker effects to those of three
tree-based machine-learning algorithms trained on 2000-2006 data to predict cognitive test scores. Columns (1)-(4)
all use the same sample of male workers observed throughout 2007-13. (1) uses the AKM worker effects also used in
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1; (2) is from a gradient boosting model; (3) is from a bagging model; (4) is from arandom
forest model.
Figure 3.15: AKM prediction error distribution
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Note: This figure shows a histogram for AKM prediction error, defined as standardized AKM worker effects (from
2007-2013) minus standardized cognitive test scores.
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Table 3.9: Summary statistics for AKM and COG, by subgroups
AKM worker effects Cognitive test scores
mean sd mean sd
All workers 0.000 1.000 -0.000 1.000
20-26 years -0.424 0.555 -0.021 0.993
27-33 years -0.167 0.799 0.008 0.994
34-40 years 0.048 0.992 0.013 1.000
41-47 years 0.160 1.104 0.018 1.012
48-54 years 0.303 1.165 0.008 1.004
55-56 years 0.383 1.183 -0.040 1.006
White collar 0.622 1.027 0.476 0.872
Intermediate 0.176 1.012 0.128 0.874
Blue collar -0.592 0.488 -0.453 0.926
Less than compulsory schooling -0.546 0.603 -1.129 0.839
Compulsory schooling only (9 years) -0.488 0.684 -0.786 0.894
Some high school (1-2 years) -0.366 0.725 -0.489 0.855
High school (2-3 years) -0.286 0.805 -0.224 0.884
Some college (¡3 years) 0.194 0.980 0.342 0.851
College (3 or more years) 0.534 1.114 0.605 0.842
PhD 1.167 1.127 1.101 0.739
Firm stayer 0.016 1.016 -0.020 1.004
Firm mover -0.034 0.965 0.043 0.989
Observations (all) 881,490 881,490
Note: This table provides summary statistics for AKM worker effects and military test scores for cognitive ability,
separately for sub-groups defined by observed characteristics.
Table 3.10: Data sources
Data source Period used Description Used for measurement of Variables used/generated
JOBB 1986-2013 Employment spells Employment Firm ID
JOBB 1986-2013 Employment spells Worker characteristics Occupation type
JOBB 1986-2013 Employment spells Firm characteristics Industry, age, location
WSS 1986-2013 Wage survey statistics Wages Full-time equivalent monthly wages
LISA 1990-2013 Various information Worker characteristics Highest educational qualification
BAKGRUND n.a. Birth register Worker characteristics Year of birth, gender
KRIGSARKIVET 1970-2004 Military draft information Worker ability Cognitive, psychological test scores
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Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation attempt to increase our understanding of the role of
labor market regulation in shaping firms’ hiring behaviour. Their contribution is to provide
some of the first evidence on how minimum wages and employment protection affect which
workers get hired. The direct conclusion emerging from both studies is that firms do adjust
the selectiveness of their hiring to these policy changes: they become less willing to employ
less able workers when minimum wages drive up labor costs at the bottom of the wage
distribution and more willing to do so when dismissal costs sink. Chapter 3 strengthens
this conclusion by confirming that estimated AKM worker effects, the productivity proxy
used in Chapters 1 and 2, is informative about workers’ cognitive ability. This final chapter
of the dissertation discusses some limitations of Chapters 1-3 and attempts to synthesize
their implications.
Limitations One weakness of Chapter 1 is that my sample includes only establishments
with 50 or more workers. As smaller employers tend to pay lower wages, they are an
important group to consider in studying the minimum wage. Having nothing to say on
smaller firms thus undermines the representativeness of my findings. A disadvantage of
relying on pre-determined AKM worker effects as an ability proxy is that I do not have
a productivity measure for all new hires. In particular, workers too young to have held a
job in the estimation interval (2002-2009) do not enter my analysis of the minimum wage’s
effect on the selectiveness of hiring. Again, this implies that I partly omit from my effect
estimates a group for which the minimum wage is important. Another limitation concerns
my minimum wage affectedness measure: in my main analysis, I approximate hourly wages
by looking only at full-time workers. This means that part-time workers and mini-jobbers
do not enter my classification of establishments as affected or unaffected by the future
minimum wage. While this is likely to bias my results toward zero and I can broadly
confirm my findings using additional hours data, my classification of employers’ exposure
to the minimum wage remains imperfect. Finally, I am unable to completely rule out that
systematic self-selection of workers causes me to overestimate the effect of the minimum
wage on employers’ worker selection.
In Chapter 2, larger and richer data as well as a different quasi experiment allow us to
overcome some of Chapter 1’s limitations. For example, we observe firms of all sizes, we
need not rely exclusively on AKM worker effects as an ability measure (but have several
productivity proxies that all point in the same direction), and the data allow us to precisely
measure exposure to the employment protection reform. A limitation Chapters 1 and 2
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have in common, however, is that while we present indicative evidence that worker self-
selection plays no significant role, we are unable to conclusively reject the possibility it
biases our estimates (though the direction is unclear in Chapter 2). Unlike in Chapter 1,
a mechanical effect of the reform on hire quality through the number of hires makes up a
significant fraction of the overall effect in Chapter 2. Both a simulation exercise we use
to purge our estimates of the mechanical effect and our analysis of new hires’ links with
incumbents from past employment suggest there is a substantial direct effect of employment
protection on firms’ worker selection; it is difficult, however, to make precise statements
about the size of this direct effect.
Chapter 3’s key limitation is that we are only able to say something about the per-
formance of AKM worker effects as an ability proxy for men as nearly all workers who
underwent military draft testing are male. A further limitation of Chapter 3 is that our
cognitive ability measure is far from capturing everything that makes a worker productive.
This is true in terms of scope—traits as diverse as communication skills, physical strength,
charisma, patience or conscientiousness may contribute to individual productivity. It is
also true in terms of time and measurement error—we do not have true contemporaneous
cognitive ability but a noisy test score from age 18. Yet, it is difficult to imagine data bet-
ter suited to our purpose: maybe one would prefer incentivized standardized tests along
multiple dimensions that are repeated at regular intervals. However, such a measure is
unlikely to ever become available for a sufficiently large sample of workers.
Policy implications The findings of Chapters 1 and 2 strongly suggest that labor market
regulation affects employers’ hiring standards. The implications of this for policy-makers
have already been discussed briefly in the Chapters’ respective conclusions: there may
be distributional consequences of minimum wages and employment protection that run
counter to the policies’ intended effect.
To the extent that a minimum wage is supposed to boost the income of low-wage
workers, for instance, it may have an unintended side effect by making it harder for the
least productive to find a job. This implication is different from the old contention that
minimum wages may destroy low-wage jobs. The difference is that my findings in Chapter
1 suggest that regardless of whether there are net employment effects, low-wage jobs may
be re-distributed away from the least productive workers, increasing the likelihood of being
unemployed for those with the lowest earnings power. Fairris and Bujanda (2008) have
aptly described this as dissipation of the minimum wage-induced gains for low earners.
The claim that employment protection may benefit insiders (incumbents) but hurt
outsiders (job seekers) has also been around for a long time. Indeed, one study has al-
ready drawn attention to the distributional aspect of dismissal costs: Kugler and Saint-Paul
(2004) show that an increase in employment protection favors employed job-seekers against
the unemployed. Our findings from Chapter 2 provide evidence on an additional distribu-
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tional dimension: by affecting firms’ worker selection, employment protection may make it
likelier that the lowest-ability workers end up as the outsiders, stacking the distribution of
jobs and job security against them.
What then could policy-makers do with this information? It would be wrong-headed
to ignore or disproportionately discount the distributional benefits of minimum wages and
employment protection on the basis that, even without aggregate employment losses, there
might be losers from these regulations. Instead, public employment services could allow for
the possibility that it is actually increasingly difficult for those ending up in unemployment
to be matched with jobs—partly because minimum wages and employment protection raise
hiring thresholds. This realization may (further) shift the focus of active labor market
policies for unemployed workers with low productivity from instruments targeting the
matching process (such as job search and application coaching) to interventions attempting
to improve workers’ productive capabilities (such as training or re-training).
Potential future research Based on the evidence presented in this dissertation and
available elsewhere, the policy implications discussed above remain somewhat speculative.
One important step toward providing a more solid evidence base would be to directly
test whether minimum wages and employment protection cause the pool of unemployed
low-skill workers to become more negatively selected.
Another follow-up analysis putting the policy implications on a firmer footing would be
to relax the implicit assumption of Chapters 1 and 2 that workers’ self-selection into firms
remained unchanged by the reforms. This assumption makes it possible to infer a change
in firms’ hiring thresholds from the equilibrium outcomes of labor supply and demand. I
see two possible ways of relaxing it. One is working with data on job requirements from
posted vacancies as in Deming and Kahn (2018). In the course of reviewing the chapters for
inclusion in this dissertation I realized that there is an independent and contemporanous
working paper, Clemens et al. (2018), that does just that and confirms the positive effect
of minimum wages on firms’ demand for the quality of labor.
A second way would be to pursue a similar strategy as Chapters 1 and 2 (identifying
hiring standards from actual worker ability) but explicitly studying the ability of applicants,
not of realized hires. Presumably, this would only be feasible with company personnel
records. Obtaining such data from enough firms that there is variation in the exposure
to a policy change in question appears difficult. A more promising approach might be to
work with records from an HR service provider that recruits workers for other employers.
Chapter 3 does not have any direct policy implications – its target audience are applied
economists in search of valid individual ability proxies. There are, however, worthwhile
ways in which the analysis could be extended in future. In particular, it would be instructive
to also assess the performance as ability proxies of the alternatives to estimated AKM
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worker effects proposed in the recent literature (e.g., Hagedorn et al., 2017; Abowd et al.,
2018; Bonhomme et al., 2018).
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